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 The Polymorphic Principle 
 and the Judicial Role 
 in Statutory Interpretation 
 
 by Jonathan R. Siegel
 
 
[We decline to] establish within our jurisprudence, beyond 
the power of Congress to remedy, the dangerous principle 
that judges can give the same statutory text different 
meanings in different cases. 
  
 Clark v. Martinez, 125 S. Ct. 716, 727 (2005). 
 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
    
 The Supreme Court’s statutory interpretation cases present an ongoing 
clash among methods of statutory interpretation—a clash that reflects a 
larger dispute over the proper judicial role in our system of government.  
On the one side, the textualists tend to prefer mechanical, rules-based 
methods of interpretation that, at least ostensibly, minimize the role of 
judicial choice in the interpretive process.1  The other side, often (though 
not invariably) in the name of implementing congressional intent, prefers a 
more flexible, standards-based approach, which calls upon courts to make 
intelligent choices and, on appropriate occasions, to deviate from the most 
straightforward or canonical reading of statutory text in order to reach the 
most appropriate result.2  The two sides thus have different visions of the 
judicial role. 
 In this ongoing clash among interpretive methods, the textualists 
recently won another battle.  Indeed, their victory was unusually powerful.  
Not only did Justice Scalia convince the Supreme Court to resolve a case 
on textualist grounds, he convinced six other Justices to join an opinion 
                                                 
 Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School.  A.B. Harvard 
University; J.D. Yale Law School. 
1 Caleb Nelson, What is Textualism?, 91 Va. L. Rev. 347, 350, 374-403 (2005). 
2 Id. at 349, 398. 
 stating that a particular textualist rule of statutory construction is so strong 
that it must always apply; courts lack power to deviate from it. 
 The case, Clark v. Martinez,3 turned on the question of whether a 
single term in a single statutory provision must always have a single 
meaning.  If, for example, a statute takes the form, “if (A or B), then C,” 
must C have the same meaning in cases involving A as in cases involving 
B?  In Martinez, the Supreme Court said the answer is always yes.4
 Like so many issues of statutory interpretation, this seemingly simple 
question implicates the largest issues, both of statutory interpretation and, 
ultimately, the proper judicial role in our system of government.  Martinez 
presents, in perfect microcosm, the general clash over interpretive 
methodologies.  It is notable on two levels, first, for its creation of a new 
and unique canon of statutory construction, and second, for what it says 
about the Supreme Court’s understanding of the judicial role.  This Article 
explores Martinez on both levels, using the case as a window into the 
larger questions of statutory interpretation and the separation of powers.   
 First, the Article explores whether there is really a canon of statutory 
construction that requires courts to determine that a single phrase in a 
single statutory provision always has a single meaning—a canon that this 
article will refer to as the strong unitary principle.  Scholars have long 
considered the canons of construction as a fruitful field of study,5 but the 
question of this particular canon’s existence has received but little 
attention.6  With Martinez, the question bursts forth as a general issue in 
                                                 
3 125 S. Ct. 716 (2005). 
4 Id. at 722-27. 
5 E.g., Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United 
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW  25-29 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997); 
William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words:  Early Understandings of the “Judicial 
Power” in Statutory Interpretation, 1776-1806, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 990, 1099-1105 
(2001); John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 
108-26 (2001); Jonathan  R. Siegel, Textualism and Contextualism in Administrative 
Law, 78 B.U. L. Rev. 1023, 1043-44 (1998); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules 
of Statutory Interpretation, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 2085, 2148-50 (2002); Karl N. Llewellyn, 
Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons about How 
Statutes are to be Construed, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 395 (1950). 
6The question was the subject of a recent scholarly symposium exchange with regard to 
constitutional text.  Saikrishna Prakash, Our Three Commerce Clauses and the 
Presumption of Intrasentence Uniformity, 55 Ark. L. Rev. 1149 (2003); Adrian 
Vermeule, Three Commerce Clauses?  No Problem, 55 Ark. L. Rev. 1175 (2003).  With 
regard to statutory interpretation, the question has previously been addressed primarily in 
the context of statutes that impose both civil liability and criminal penalties for specified 
conduct; scholars have examined whether, in such statutes, the provisions specifying the 
forbidden conduct must receive a uniform interpretation that applies to both civil and 
criminal cases.  Lawrence M. Solan, Statutory Inflation and Institutional Choice, 44 Wm. 
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 statutory interpretation.  The Supreme Court not only determined that it 
would read the statute before it in accordance with the strong unitary 
principle, but it held that the principle must always apply.7  The Court 
asserted that any contrary interpretive approach would be “novel” and 
“dangerous.”8
 This Article first shows that the Court erred in its descriptive claim 
that departure from the strong unitary principle would be “novel.”  In 
numerous cases, courts, including the Supreme Court, have applied the 
contrary principle that a single term or phrase in a single statutory 
provision may have multiple meanings—an interpretive approach that this 
article will call the polymorphic principle.  As this Article will show, 
courts employ the polymorphic principle in a variety of situations, most 
commonly when some special rule of statutory interpretation calls for a 
special construction of statutory text in one circumstance, but has no 
application in other circumstances.9  Courts also sometimes employ the 
polymorphic principle when necessary as a pure policy matter.10
 The Article then takes on the Court’s normative assertion that the 
polymorphic principle is “dangerous.”  The choice between the strong 
unitary principle and the polymorphic principle, this Article shows, 
implicates the most fundamental questions concerning the proper judicial 
role in our system of government.11  The Martinez opinion, this Article 
suggests, cannot be understood independently of the identity of its author, 
Justice Scalia.  The opinion does not simply endorse a particular rule of 
statutory construction; it represents a stage in Justice Scalia’s long-term 
campaign to limit judicial choice.  By taking away judicial discretion to 
give a single piece of statutory text multiple meanings, Justice Scalia 
hopes to further his ultimate goal of limiting the judicial role in our system 
of government. 
 This Article attempts to show that Justice Scalia’s campaign and his 
consequent embrace of the strong unitary principle are misguided.  It is an 
                                                                                                                         
& Mary L. Rev. 2209 (2003); Margaret V. Sachs, Harmonizing Civil and Criminal 
Enforcement of Federal Regulatory Statutes:  The Case of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, 2001 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1025 (2001). 
7 125 S. Ct. at 724. 
8 Id. at 725, 727. 
9 See infra Parts II.B.1, 2 (describing cases of “constitutional avoidance” polymorphism 
and “subconstitutional” polymorphism). 
10 See infra Part II.B.3 (describing cases of “policy” polymorphism). 
11 For some previous commentary, see John F. Manning, Deriving Rules of Statutory 
Interpretation from the Constitution, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1648 (2001); William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 621 (1990); Jonathan R. Siegel, 
What Statutory Drafting Errors Teach Us About Statutory Interpretation, 69 Geo. Wash. 
L. Rev. 309 (2001). 
- 3 - 
 error, this Article suggests, to attempt to mechanize the judicial role in 
statutory interpretation and drive out the necessity for intelligent judicial 
choice.12  The Constitution permits the exercise of the degree of judicial 
choice necessary to implement the polymorphic principle.13  Moreover, as 
with so many textualist practices, the strong unitary principle does not, in 
fact, limit judicial choice; it only presents the illusion of doing so.14  
Indeed, ironically, the strong unitary principle would often have the effect 
of magnifying the role of judicial choice in statutory interpretation.15  
Thus, even those who seek to limit the role of judicial choice wherever 
possible should be reluctant to embrace it. 
 Part I of this Article describes Clark v. Martinez and its endorsement 
of the strong unitary principle.  Part II then demonstrates, as a descriptive 
matter, that courts in fact employ the contrary polymorphic principle.  Part 
II analyzes the different categories of cases in which the polymorphic 
principle appears and the motivations that drive courts to employ it. 
 Part III then considers the conflict between the polymorphic principle 
and the strong unitary principle as a normative matter.  This Part views the 
conflict in the larger context of general theories of statutory interpretation.  
The Constitution, this Part attempts to show, does not compel Justice 
Scalia’s textualist theory of interpretation; nor does it forbid the degree of 
judicial choice necessary to implementation of the polymorphic principle. 
 Part IV concludes by considering the likely future of the polymorphic 
principle.  Although Martinez appears very clearly to embrace the strong 
unitary principle, this Part suggests that the Supreme Court lacks firm 
commitment in methodological matters and that it will probably revert to 
the polymorphic principle in the future when the occasion so demands.  
Accordingly, this Part attempts to give some guidance as to the 
appropriate use of the polymorphic principle in particular cases and, 
finally, to explore whether Congress should play a role in choosing 
between the polymorphic principle and the strong unitary principle. 
   
I.  CLARK v. MARTINEZ AND THE UNITARY PRINCIPLE 
 
 The Supreme Court has always recognized that the terms in any 
federal statutory provision take their meaning, in part, from the context 
provided by the entire statute.  A particular aspect of this general principle 
is the long-standing presumption that if a word or phrase occurs multiple 
                                                 
12 See infra Parts III.B, III.C. 
13 See infra Part III.C.2. 
14 See infra Part III.C.3. 
15 See infra Part III.C.4. 
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 times in a statute, it has the same meaning each time.16  Professor Akhil 
Amar recently called attention to the importance of drawing inferences 
from multiple appearances of the same or similar terms in the same legal 
document.  He dubbed this interpretive technique “intratextualism” and 
explored its use in constitutional interpretation.17
 The presumption that recurring words or phrases have the same 
meaning each time they appear gathers strength as the multiple 
appearances approach each other in statutory proximity.   There is some 
inference that words have consistent meanings throughout the United 
States Code, but the inference becomes a presumption only when a term 
occurs multiple times within a single statute.18  Moreover, distinctions 
arise even within such cases:  where a term recurs multiple times in 
closely proximate statutory provisions, the courts will apply the 
presumption more strongly than when a term recurs in distantly separated 
sections of the same statute.19  Recognizing the significance of still closer 
statutory proximity, the Court has said that the presumption is “at its most 
vigorous” when a term appears multiple times within a single statutory 
sentence.20
 Even recurrent appearance multiple times within a single sentence 
does not, however, quite represent the ultimate in potential statutory 
proximity.  Sometimes, a term occurs a single time in a single statutory 
provision, but courts must interpret the term in different cases presenting 
different circumstances.  The question then arises whether the single term 
must always have a single meaning.   
 
 A. The (Weak) Unitary Principle 
 Given that courts presume that a single term has a single meaning 
when it recurs multiple times within a statute and that they apply this 
presumption more and more strongly as the multiple occurrences of the 
term approach each other in statutory proximity, it is no surprise to 
discover that courts usually determine that a term occurring a single time 
                                                 
16 E.g., Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101 (2003); Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 
U.S. 478, 484 (1990); Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States., 286 U.S. 427, 433 
(1932). 
17 See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 747 (1999). 
18 Firstar Bank, N.A. v. Faul, 253 F.3d 982, 991 (7th Cir. 2001) (inference that words 
recurring in different statutes have the same meaning is “relatively weak”).   
19 See Commissioner v. Lundy, 516 U.S. 235, 250 (1996) (noting the “close proximity of 
the[] provisions of the statute” involved).  Another form of proximity is temporal; the 
presumption may apply when Congress uses the same language in two different statutes 
if it enacts one shortly after the other.  Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. ___, slip op. at 
4 (2005) (plurality opinion). 
20 Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994). 
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 in a single statutory provision should have a single meaning.  This rule of 
statutory interpretation will be called the “unitary principle.”21  To the 
extent that this principle serves as one indicator of statutory meaning but is 
not always dispositive in every case to which it applies, the principle will 
be called the “weak unitary principle.”   
 A couple of examples will serve to establish the principle’s existence 
and demonstrate its operation.  The Supreme Court recently had occasion 
to apply the unitary principle when construing section 5 of the Voting 
Rights Act in Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board.22  In a state or 
political subdivision subject to the Act’s “preclearance” requirement, 
Section 5 authorizes judicial preclearance of a proposed change in voting 
practices provided the proposed change “does not have the purpose and 
will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on 
account of race or color.”23  Bossier Parish posed the question of whether 
a court could preclear a voting change that had a dilutive, but 
nonretrogressive, purpose (that is, the change had the purpose of creating a 
voting scheme that diluted minority votes, but no more so than the existing 
scheme).24   
 The Court first observed that it had previously held that a dilutive 
voting change has the effect of “denying or abridging the right to vote on 
account of race or color” within the meaning of section 5 only if the 
change is retrogressive.25  The Court then resolved Bossier Parish by 
applying the unitary principle.  Section 5, the Court noted, ties the single 
phrase, “denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or 
color,” to two possible triggers, “purpose” and “effect.”  Having 
previously held that the quoted phrase covered only retrogressive changes 
with regard to “effect,” the Court held that the phrase had the same limited 
meaning with regard to “purpose.” The Court noted that a contrary 
interpretation would be “simply an untenable construction of the text,”26 
and that the Court would “refuse to adopt a construction that would 
attribute different meanings to the same phrase in the same sentence, 
depending on which object it is modifying.”27   
                                                 
21 Prakash refers to this principle as the “presumption of intrasentence uniformity,” 
Prakash, supra note 6, at 1149, but the “unitary principle” provides a better linguistic 
match with the “polymorphic principle.” 
22 528 U.S. 320 (2000). 
23 5 U.S.C. § 1973c; see Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd., 528 U.S. 320 (2000). 
24 See 528 U.S. at 335. 
25 See 528 U.S. at 329 (citing Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976)). 
26 528 U.S. at 329. 
27 Id.  
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  The Court applied the same principle in Bankamerica Corp. v. United 
States,28 which required it to interpret the prohibition, contained in section 
8 of the Clayton Act, against interlocking corporate directorates among 
competing companies “other than banks, banking associations, trust 
companies, and common carriers.”29  The question was whether this 
exemption permitted interlocking directorates between any two companies 
at least one of which was a bank, or whether the exemption applied only 
when both companies were banks.  The Court solved the case by 
combining a concession with the unitary principle.  The United States 
conceded that the exemption permitted interlocking directorates between 
any two corporations, at least one of which was a common carrier.  The 
Court concluded that the same rule must apply to banks.  The Court said, 
“[W]e reject as unreasonable the contention that Congress intended the 
phrase ‘other than’ to mean one thing when applied to ‘banks’ and another 
thing as applied to ‘common carriers,’ where the phrase ‘other than’ 
modifies both words in the same clause.”30
 Both these cases demonstrate that a single term in a single statutory 
provision should normally have a single meaning.  If a previous case, a 
party’s concession, or, presumably, ordinary principles of construction 
establish that a statutory term has a particular meaning under given 
circumstances (as, for example, when it interacts with some particular 
other statutory text), its meaning should not change with changing 
circumstances.  So, if a statute takes the form, “if (A or B) then C,” and 
courts have established that C has a particular meaning in cases involving 
A, the unitary principle would indicate that C should have that same 
meaning in cases involving B. 
 The unitary principle has not received much attention, except for the 
case of statutes that have both civil and criminal applications.  If a statute 
forbids certain conduct and attaches both civil liability and criminal 
penalties to that conduct, the question may arise whether the civil 
liabilities and criminal penalties attach to precisely the same conduct.  
Normally, if the statute makes no differentiation between the two, one 
would assume the answer to be yes.  Consider, for example, a statute of 
the form: 
 
                                                 
28 462 U.S. 122 (1983). 
29 15 U.S.C. § 19.  
30 462 U.S. at 129. 
- 7 - 
   § 1.  Conduct X is forbidden. 
§ 2.  Any person who violates § 1 shall be liable to any 
injured party for the resulting damages. 
§ 3. Any person convicted of violating § 1 shall be 
sentenced to a term of 1 year in prison. 
 
One would normally assume that § 1 had a single meaning that would 
apply both to civil actions under § 2 and criminal prosecutions under § 3.  
This assumption, however, may have a peculiar result when it interacts 
with the rule of lenity, a principle of statutory interpretation applicable to 
criminal statutes.  If § 1 is ambiguous, the rule of lenity calls for it to 
receive a narrow construction, so that the public has fair warning of 
conduct that could result in a criminal sanction.31  In such a case, if the 
best understanding of § 1 is broader, must courts nonetheless give the 
section a narrow construction, even in civil cases arising under § 2, so that 
the section can have a single meaning?  The most common answer given 
by courts and scholars is yes:  the combined effect of the unitary principle 
and the rule of lenity requires narrow construction, even in civil cases, of 
ambiguous statutes that impose civil and criminal sanctions on the same 
conduct.32
 The cases discussed above show that the issue of properly interpreting 
a “mixed” civil/criminal statute is just one aspect of a more general issue 
in statutory interpretation.  More generally, the question is whether a 
single term in a single statutory provision should have a single meaning, 
even when that term must interact with multiple, other statutory provisions 
in different circumstances.  The unitary principle says that the answer is 
normally yes. 
  
                                                 
31 E.g., Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393, 409 (2003) 
(“[W]hen there are two rational readings of a criminal statute, one harsher than the other, 
we are to choose the harsher only when Congress has spoken in clear and definite 
language.”) (internal quotation omitted). 
32 E.g., Leocal v. Ashcroft, 125 S. Ct. 377, 384 n.8 (applying the rule of lenity in a 
deportation case, because the statute at issue also applied to criminal cases); United States 
v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 517-518 (1992) (plurality opinion) 
(applying the rule of lenity in a tax case to a statute that also imposed criminal penalties); 
Federal Communications Commission v. American Broadcasting Co., 347 U.S. 284, 296 
(1954) (applying rule of lenity in a civil, administrative setting; “There cannot be one 
construction for the Federal Communications Commission and another for the 
Department of Justice.”); Sachs, supra note 6, at 1030-33. 
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  B. The Strong Unitary Principle 
 The cases discussed so far applied the unitary principle as an ordinary 
principle of construction that provides one indicator of the most likely 
meaning of statutory text.  Neither Bossier Parish nor Bankamerica 
suggested that courts must regard the unitary principle as completely 
inviolable.  Nor did either case suggest that a court’s disregard for the 
principle would implicate the separation of powers.  
 This past Term, however, the Supreme Court took the unitary principle 
to a new level.  The Court declared that the unitary principle is not simply 
one indicator of statutory meaning, but an inviolable decree.  The Court 
determined not only that a single term in a single statutory provision 
should normally have a single meaning, but that it must always have a 
single meaning, and that any suggestion to the contrary is “novel” and 
“dangerous” and an affront to the separation of powers.  This new 
principle will be called the strong unitary principle. 
 The occasion for the Court’s enunciation of its new principle arose in 
Clark v. Martinez, an immigration case.33  The case concerned the 
problem of aliens held in detention for long periods of time pending 
removal from the country.  Once a final order for removal of an alien is 
entered, the government normally removes the alien during a 90-day 
“removal period” fixed by statute.34  Sometimes, however, problems arise, 
as, for example, when no other country agrees to receive the alien.35  In 
such cases, the government may rely on a statutory provision that 
authorizes it to detain an alien beyond the removal period.  The applicable 
statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1231, provides: 
 
An alien ordered removed who is inadmissible under section 1182 
of this title, removable under section 1227(a)(1)(C), 1227(a)(2), or 
1227(a)(4) of this title or who has been determined by the Attorney 
General to be a risk to the community or unlikely to comply with 
the order of removal, may be detained beyond the removal 
period.36
 
When an alien fell within the statute, and no other country would receive 
the alien, the government maintained that it had the authority to detain the 
alien indefinitely, and, in some cases, detained such aliens for years.37  
                                                 
33 125 S. Ct. 716 (2005). 
34 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A); see Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 682 (2001). 
35 See, e.g., 533 U.S. at 684-86 (describing two such cases). 
36 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (emphasis added).  
37 See, e.g., 533 U.S. at 684-86 (describing such cases). 
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 The question therefore arose whether the statutory provision stating that 
the Attorney General “may” detain certain aliens “beyond the removal 
period” authorized indefinite detentions. 
 The Supreme Court had previously addressed this question in 
Zadvydas v. Davis,38 a case involving aliens who had been admitted to the 
United States but who subsequently became removable under one of the 
statutory provisions listed in § 1231.39  As to such aliens, the Court 
determined, indefinite detention would raise a serious constitutional 
concern, because it would invade the core of the “liberty” protected by the 
Due Process Clause.40  Without actually holding such indefinite detention 
unconstitutional, the Court invoked the interpretive principle of 
“constitutional avoidance.”41  Over a strenuous, four-Justice dissent that 
argued that its reading of § 1231 was implausible and simply bore “no 
relation to the text,”42 the Court determined that § 1231 implicitly limited 
detention to the period reasonably necessary to secure an alien’s removal 
and did not authorize detention after removal was no longer reasonably 
foreseeable.43  This reading of § 1231 avoided the serious constitutional 
problem posed by the government’s claim of authority to detain aliens 
indefinitely. 
 In an apparent limitation of its holding, however, the Court noted that 
the case concerned removable aliens, that is, aliens admitted to the United 
States who later became subject to deportation.  Aliens never admitted to 
the United States would, the Court said, “present a very different 
question.”44  This express reservation suggested that indefinite detention 
of inadmissible aliens might pose a lesser constitutional concern and that 
the Court might give § 1231 a more straightforward, textual reading as to 
such aliens. 
 Not long thereafter, Martinez presented just the question the Court had 
apparently reserved:  the question of indefinite detention of inadmissible 
aliens.  Such aliens, like removable aliens, pose a problem if their actual 
removal cannot be achieved.  The case concerned an alien from Cuba who, 
after being ruled inadmissible, was held beyond the 90-day removal period 
                                                 
38 533 U.S. 678 (2001). 
39 533 U.S. at 682. 
40 Id. at 690. 
41 This interpretive doctrine provides that “where a statute is susceptible of two 
constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by 
the other of which such questions are avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter.” Jones v. 
United States, 526 U.S. 227, 239 (1999) (internal quotation omitted). 
42 533 U.S. at 707 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
43 Id. at 699-702. 
44 Id. at 682. 
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 because Cuba would not receive him.45  The government reminded the 
Court that it had, in Zadvydas, called this a “very different question”46 and 
argued that the differences between inadmissible and removable aliens 
dictated a different statutory result. 
 The government must have been rather surprised by the outcome.  
Although the Court had expressly reserved the question of inadmissible 
aliens in Zadvydas, the Court, speaking through Justice Scalia, now held 
that reservation to be utterly ineffective.  The dispositive point, the Court 
said, was the unitary principle.  The Court noted that the statutory phrase, 
“may be detained beyond the removal period,” applies without 
differentiation to all categories of aliens mentioned in § 1231.  This single 
phrase, the Court held, must have a single meaning.  Because § 1231 boils 
down to saying that “aliens in category A, B, or C may be detained beyond 
the removal period,” and because the Court had previously interpreted the 
phrase “may be detained beyond the removal period” in connection with 
category B, the phrase must have the same meaning in connection with 
category A.47
 The Court did not apply the unitary principle as it had in previous 
cases, as one indicator of statutory meaning.  The Court held that the 
unitary principle is entirely determinative of statutory meaning.  
Moreover, the Court declared that deviations from the principle cannot be 
tolerated because they would be an affront to the separation of powers. 
 Having observed that the critical statutory phrase, “may be detained 
beyond the removal period,” applies without differentiation to the three 
categories of aliens mentioned in § 1231, the Court said that “[t]o give 
these same words a different meaning for each category would be to 
invent a statute rather than interpret one.”48  The Court recognized the 
interpretive problem as a general one.  It noted that “[i]t is not at all 
unusual to give a statute’s ambiguous language a limiting construction 
called for by one of the statute’s applications, even though other of the 
statute’s applications, standing alone, would not support the same 
limitation.”49  In such cases, the Court said, “[t]he lowest common 
denominator, as it were, must govern.”50
 The Court recognized that this strong formulation of the unitary 
                                                 
45 The alien had actually lived in the United States for over a decade pursuant to “parole” 
granted by the Attorney General.  125 S. Ct. at 720.  Such parole does not, however, 
constitute “admission” of the alien.  8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). 
46 See Brief for Respondent, Clark v. Martinez, at 27. 
47 125 S. Ct. at 722-23. 
48 125 S. Ct. at 722-23.  
49 Id. at 724. 
50 Id. (emphasis added). 
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 principle gives the principle great power.  Under the strong unitary 
principle, a court interpreting a statutory phrase cannot simply focus on 
the case before it.  The Court pointed out that “when deciding which of 
two plausible statutory constructions to adopt, a court must consider the 
necessary consequences of its choice.  If one of them would raise a 
multitude of constitutional problems, the other should prevail—whether or 
not those constitutional problems pertain to the particular litigant before 
the Court.”51
 The Court severely attacked the dissent’s proposed departure from the 
unitary principle.  Justice Thomas, joined by the Chief Justice, asserted 
that the prior holding of Zadvydas was “tethered . . . to the specific class of 
aliens” involved in that case, namely, removable aliens, as to which 
indefinite detention raised constitutional doubts.52  The Court, he argued, 
should inquire whether reading § 1231 to permit indefinite detention of 
inadmissible aliens would raise similar doubts, and interpret the statute 
accordingly, even though the result might be “different detention periods 
for different classes of aliens.”53  The Court sternly rejected what it called 
this “novel interpretive approach,” which “would render every statute a 
chameleon.”54   
 The Court capped off its opinion with this dire warning: 
 
[F]or this Court to sanction indefinite detention in the face 
of Zadvydas would establish within our jurisprudence, 
beyond the power of Congress to remedy, the dangerous 
principle that judges can give the same statutory text 
different meanings in different cases.55
 
 This is strong stuff.  Not only does the Court endorse the strong 
unitary principle, it appears to believe that that approach was already the 
established law—witness the Court’s reference to the dissent’s approach 
as “novel” and the Court’s statement that reading the statute as requested 
by the dissent and the government “would establish” the principle that 
judges can give the same statutory text different meanings in different 
cases; i.e., that principle would be something new.  The Court also calls 
this allegedly novel principle “dangerous” and intimates that it would 
violate the separation of powers because it would require judges to act as 
                                                 
51 Id. at 724. 
52 125 S. Ct. at 730 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 725. 
55 Id. at 727. 
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 legislators. 
 Would departure from the unitary principle really be “novel”?  Would 
it be “dangerous”?  The remainder of this Article address these questions.  
First, the next section demonstrates that departures from the unitary 
principle are not novel at all; although courts certainly apply the unitary 
principle as a presumptive rule of statutory interpretation, numerous cases 
shows that the presumption is defeasible.  Part III then places the debate 
over the unitary principle in the larger context of the debate over the 
proper judicial role in statutory interpretation.  
 
II.  THE POLYMORPHIC PRINCIPLE 
 
 A review of actual judicial practices reveals that, contrary to Clark v. 
Martinez, courts have not previously embraced the strong unitary 
principle.  Although courts usually presume that a single term employed a 
single time in a single statutory provision should bear the same meaning in 
all of its applications, in some cases courts determine that a single 
statutory term or phrase must bear different meanings under different 
circumstances.  The principle that courts have the freedom to engage in 
such interpretation in appropriate cases will be referred to as the 
polymorphic principle.   
 
 A.  Polymorphic Operators 
 The term “polymorphic” is borrowed from computer science.  
Computers, like courts, carry out an interpretive task.  Like the Supreme 
Court in Martinez, computers must decide whether the symbols they 
interpret have the same meaning every time, or whether a symbol’s 
meaning may vary.  A “polymorphic operator,” in computer science, is a 
symbol that may have different meanings depending on context. 
 Computers carry out instructions provided by programmers in some 
programming language.  Computers perform this task in a fashion that 
frustrates many a programmer, although some judges might consider it an 
ideal to which courts ought to aspire:  computers use a purely literal 
method of construction.  They do not consult a programmer’s intent on the 
ground that her literal instructions are ambiguous or lead to an absurd 
result.  If a programmer instructs a computer to do something absurd, the 
computer will faithfully do it.   
 Still, for all their maddening literalism, computers have some ability to 
consider context in interpreting their instructions.  It is here that they 
employ the concept of polymorphic operators. Consider a simple symbol 
such as “+”.  Probably the reader would imagine that “+” has a single, 
unambiguous meaning, but in fact matters are more complicated.   
 When a computer sees a line of code such as: 
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 x = 5 + 3 
 
it understands “=” to be an assignment operator, so the code tells the 
computer to compute the value of “5 + 3” and assign the result to the 
variable “x”.  The tricky part comes in interpreting the meaning of the 
symbol “+”.   In this example, the computer will, of course, understand the 
symbol “+” to instruct it to add the values of the integers 5 and 3, yielding 
the integer 8, the value it will assign to the variable x.  
 Easy enough, but what if the line of code were: 
 
x = 5.0 + 3.0 
 
Now the values to be added are “floating point numbers”—that is, 
numbers that have both integer and decimal parts, rather than just integers.  
To a human, this may seem a trivial detail, but to a computer 5 and 5.0 can 
be quite different entities.  In many computer languages, the internal 
routines for adding 5 to 3 are entirely different from those for adding 5.0 
to 3.0.56  Thus, in executing the second statement, the computer calls upon 
quite different internal code than in executing the first. 
 An even more obviously different example would be this: 
 
 name = “John” + “Smith” 
 
Now the items to be “added” are not numbers at all, but two series of 
letters, known in the computer world as “strings.”  The symbol “+” must 
have a different meaning in this instruction than it did in the two 
instructions given above.  In most languages, the “+” operation, applied to 
strings, is defined as concatenation, so that the result of the instruction 
above would be to assign the string “JohnSmith” to the variable “name.”  
The reader can appreciate that an entirely different sequence of 
instructions would be needed to concatenate “John” and “Smith” than 
would accomplish the addition of 5 and 3. 
 Thus, the symbol “+,” although generically representing the concept of 
combination, really has three different meanings in the three examples 
given above, depending on what is to be combined.  It might well have 
other meanings when used to instruct a computer to combine still other 
kinds of items such as arrays, structures, or other data types that may exist 
within a computer language.   
                                                 
56 These differences are summed up in the programming maxim, “1.0 + 1.0 hardly ever = 
2.0.”  The perils of floating-point arithmetic make it inadvisable for programmers to 
check floating-point numbers for equality. 
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  The result is that “+” is a polymorphic operator.  The computer 
understands it to mean different things depending on the context.  When 
instructed to perform the operation “+” on two integers, the computer does 
one thing (it adds them); when instructed to perform the operation “+” on 
two strings, the computer does something else (it concatenates them), 
using different internal code. 
 
 B.  A Parade of Polymorphisms 
 So much for computers, let us return to statutes.  As noted in Part I, the 
Supreme Court asserted in Clark v. Martinez that the polymorphic 
principle was “novel.”  In fact, it is nothing of the kind.  To be sure, courts 
follow the unitary principle that a single term or phrase in a single 
statutory provision should normally have a single meaning, but that is only 
the weak unitary principle, which is compatible with the polymorphic 
principle that courts may, in appropriate cases, give a single phrase 
multiple meanings.  
 Instances of the polymorphic principle, though infrequent, are 
sufficiently numerous that they may be grouped into useful categories.  
Two dimensions of categorization are used below.  First, and primarily, 
the cases are grouped according to the perceived motivation for the use of 
the polymorphic principle.  As the examples below demonstrate, the 
polymorphic principle commonly comes into play when some special 
reason motivates a court to interpret a statute a particular way in one of its 
applications, and the reason does not apply to other applications.  The 
special reason may be the need to avoid a constitutional problem 
(“constitutional avoidance polymorphism”),57 a special interpretive rule 
developed in the shadow of constitutional principles (“subconstitutional 
polymorphism”),58 an undesirable policy result of reading the statute a 
particular way in a particular circumstance (“policy polymorphism”),59 or 
the desire to adhere to, but not to extend, a prior decision now perceived as 
erroneous (“stare decisis polymorphism”).60  In any of these 
circumstances, application of the unitary principle would force a court to 
override the best reading of the statute in some cases in order to give it a 
single meaning that could handle the special cases.   
 Within each motivational category, one may differentiate cases 
according to the different ways in which the polymorphic principle can 
manifest itself.  Some cases present actual court holdings that a statutory 
term has different meanings in different cases.  Such cases will be dubbed 
                                                 
57 See infra Part II.B.1. 
58 See infra Part II.B.2. 
59 See infra Part II.B.3. 
60 See infra Part II.B.4. 
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 cases of “express polymorphism.”61  In other cases the courts have not 
expressly treated statutory text as polymorphic, but one may infer an 
inclination to do so, or at least a general belief in the polymorphic 
principle, on the basis of their opinions (“implied polymorphism”).  Such 
an inference may arise in at least two ways.  First, a court or a judge may 
reserve an issue for future decision in a way that would make no sense 
under the strong unitary principle.62 Second, a court may employ 
interpretive methods that disregard its duties under the strong unitary 
principle and its “least common denominator” corollary.63  Finally, some 
cases reach what appear to be polymorphic results without much 
consideration of any particular statutory text.  Such cases will be said to 
involve “tacit polymorphism.”64   
 Polymorphism also arises in sources with differing degrees of 
authority.  Sometimes the polymorphic principle is applied by the 
Supreme Court, sometimes by lower courts.  Sometimes the principle may 
be observed in the opinions of individual judges or Justices. 
 Obviously, the best evidence of the polymorphic principle is express 
polymorphism in a Supreme Court holding, and such evidence is provided 
below.  In countering the Supreme Court’s claim that the polymorphic 
principle is “novel,” however, implied polymorphism and tacit 
polymorphism, as well as polymorphism in opinions of lower courts or 
individual judges or Justices, provide some useful evidence.  So these 
appear below as well.  
 One last word before the parade of polymorphisms begins.  Authors, 
or regular readers, of articles concerning statutory interpretation will be 
familiar with the problem posed by the need for examples.  Scholars who 
have the good fortune to write in a substantive area of law can expect most 
of their readers to come to their articles armed with at least a basic 
understanding of the relevant subject matter.  Even if some exposition of 
the subject matter is needed for the general reader, it is needed only once 
per article. 
 Statutory interpretation scholars are different.  Their domain is the 
whole field of statutory law.  Examples may come from any statute about 
anything.  Each different example may require the reader to learn fine 
                                                 
61 See, e.g., infra Part II.B.1.b.  Cases of express polymorphism do not necessarily 
contain express statements of the polymorphic principle, but they do contain actual 
holdings that particular statutory text has different meanings under different 
circumstances, as opposed to merely suggesting the possibility of such different 
meanings. 
62 See, e.g., infra Part II.B.1.a. 
63 See, e.g., infra Part II.B.2. 
64 See, e.g., infra Part II.B.1.c.  
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 points of a different statutory scheme in order to appreciate how some tiny 
detail illustrates a general point about statutory interpretation.   
 The difficulty of learning all the details necessary to understand 
numerous different statutory examples can make a statutory interpretation 
article tiresome.  Omit the examples, however, and the article becomes 
vacuous.  The tedium of too many examples, and the hollowness of too 
few, are the Scylla and Charybdis between which statutory interpretation 
scholars must constantly navigate. 
 When seven Supreme Court Justices join an opinion claiming that a 
particular method of statutory interpretation is “novel,”65 the claim 
demands a response.  Only examples can convincingly demonstrate the 
truth, which is that, whatever else the polymorphic principle may be, novel 
it is not.  This section attempts to present just the right number of 
examples—not merely one or two, which might be dismissed as errors, but 
not every available example, either.  These examples illuminate not only 
the existence of the polymorphic principle, but the different motivations 
that underlie its use and the different forms in which it may operate.  This 
purely descriptive section is followed by normative analysis in Part III.    
 
 1.  “Constitutional Avoidance” Polymorphism 
 As Martinez itself suggests, a common motivation for use of the 
polymorphic principle arises when a statutory provision has one 
application that raises constitutional concerns.  In such a case, the 
interpretive doctrine of “constitutional avoidance” counsels courts to 
interpret the statute so as to avoid serious constitutional problems.66  The 
strong unitary principle would then require that any phrase that receives a 
particular construction so as to avoid constitutional problems in one 
circumstance receive that same construction in all circumstances.  
Applying that rule, however, might yield undesirable results.  In such 
cases, a court may choose to follow the polymorphic principle instead.  
The desire to confine the impact of constitutional doubt to circumstances 
in which it actually applies has given rise to polymorphism in all of its 
various forms: express, implied, and tacit. 
 
 a.  Implied Polymorphism:  the False Claims Act 
 Taking the simplest example first (even though it is an example of 
implied rather than express polymorphism), the polymorphic principle can 
be seen in the interpretation of the False Claims Act, which prohibits the 
submission of a false or fraudulent claim to the United States and provides 
that any person who submits such a claim is liable for three times the 
                                                 
65 125 S. Ct. at 725. 
66 E.g., Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 239 (1999). 
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 amount of damages sustained by the government.67  The Act allows 
enforcement of this liability in two ways:  either by an action by the 
United States acting through its own officials or by a “qui tam” action, in 
which a private party (known as the “relator”) brings suit in the name of 
the United States and, if successful, receives a share of the proceeds.68
 Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. 
Stevens69 concerned the special issues raised by False Claims Act actions 
against states. A private relator brought a qui tam suit against a state 
agency, and the defendant claimed that it could not be sued under the Act.  
The Act imposes liability on “[a]ny person” submitting a false claim,70 and 
a state agency, the defendant claimed, is not a “person” under the Act. 
 The Supreme Court agreed. Although it relied primarily on the general 
principle that the term “person” does not usually include the sovereign,71 
the Court also cited the desire to avoid the potential Eleventh Amendment 
difficulties that would arise from suits against a state entity initiated by 
private qui tam relators.72  The Court did not hold that such suits would 
violate the Eleventh Amendment, but it thought the question sufficiently 
serious to invoke the principle of constitutional avoidance.73
 Justice Ginsburg, however, joined by Justice Breyer, added this caveat 
in a concurring opinion:  Eleventh Amendment considerations would not 
apply in a suit against a state initiated by federal officials, as opposed to a 
qui tam relator.74  States have no immunity from suits by the United 
States,75 and, in such suits, the Court has not been so reluctant to find state 
entities covered by general statutory terms such as “person.”76  Justice 
Ginsburg said that she “read the Court’s decision to leave open the 
question whether the word ‘person’ encompasses States when the United 
States itself sues under the False Claims Act.”77  In other words, she left 
open the possibility that courts should treat the word “person” as a 
polymorphic operator that would sometimes include states and sometimes 
                                                 
67 31 U.S.C. § 3729. 
68 31 U.S.C. § 3730. 
69 529 U.S. 765 (2000). 
70 31 U.S.C. § 3729. 
71 529 U.S. at 780. 
72 529 U.S. at 787. 
73 Id. 
74 529 U.S. at 789 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
75 E.g., United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 530, 539 (1993); United States v. Texas, 
143 U.S. 621, 646 (1892). 
76 529 U.S. at 789 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
77 Id. at 789 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
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 not include them. 
 Of course, Justice Ginsburg’s opinion does not, by itself, show that the 
term “person” in § 3729(a) is a polymorphic operator—even a statement 
by the Court leaving the question open would not do that.  The Court may 
still someday determine that states are never “persons” under the False 
Claims Act.  But Justice Ginsburg’s statement that she regards the 
question as open is an implied polymorphism, because it implies a belief 
in the polymorphic principle.  If the Court or a Justice believed in the 
strong unitary principle, what business could the Court or that Justice have 
leaving the question open?  The strong unitary principle would require 
that, once the Court has interpreted the word “person” not to include states 
in cases brought by qui tam relators, the word must have the same 
meaning in cases brought by federal officers.  Justice Ginsburg’s 
understanding that Stevens left the question open implies that she 
embraces the polymorphic principle.78
 Indeed, the immigration cases discussed earlier (Martinez, which 
articulated the strong unitary principle, and Zadvydas, the previous case 
under the same immigration statute) provide a similar example of implied 
polymorphism in an opinion of the Court itself—albeit an example the 
Court has now disavowed.  As Justice Thomas’s dissenting opinion in 
Martinez observed, in Zadvydas the Court held that the statutory phrase 
“may be detained beyond the removal period” prohibited indefinite 
detention of removable aliens, but the Court expressly reserved the 
question of that same phrase’s application to inadmissible aliens, who 
would, the Court said, “present a very different question.”79  As Justice 
Thomas rightly complained in Martinez, if the strong unitary principle was 
an accepted feature of federal statutory interpretation jurisprudence, then 
“the careful distinction Zadvydas drew between admitted aliens and 
nonadmitted aliens was irrelevant at best and misleading at worst.”80  
Under the strong unitary principle, the construction given to the phrase 
“may be detained beyond the removal period” would necessarily apply to 
all of the statutory categories of aliens. The Court’s reservation of the 
issue of inadmissible aliens in Zadvydas is clearly inconsistent with the 
view that the strong unitary principle was an established principle of 
interpretation at the time of that case. 
                                                 
78 Two district courts have in fact subsequently held that states are “persons” within the 
meaning of the False Claims Act when sued by the United States acting through its 
officials.  United States ex rel. Chittister v. Department of Community and Economic 
Development, No. 1:CV-99-2057 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 2002); United States v. University 
Hosp. at Stony Brook, 2001 WL 1548797 (E.D.N.Y 2001).  At the district court level, 
therefore, the False Claims Act provides an example of express polymorphism. 
79 533 U.S. at 682. 
80 125 S. Ct. at 731 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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 b.  Express Polymorphism:  the Medicare Act 
 Vermont Agency exhibits polymorphism, but only implied 
polymorphism, and only in a Justice’s separate opinion.  Of course what 
the reader really wants to see is express polymorphism in an actual 
Supreme Court opinion.  The Medicare Act provides an example. 
 The critical issue concerns how parties may seek judicial review of 
Medicare benefits.  The Medicare Act provides a comprehensive scheme 
under which benefits are paid and under which recipients may seek review 
of benefits decisions.  The Act attempts to channel all challenges to 
Medicare decisions into this special process, which requires a claimant 
first to present a claim for benefits and then, if dissatisfied, to seek judicial 
review of the administrative ruling on the claim.81  The Act attempts to 
block any other suits, such as suits under the general federal question 
jurisdiction, by providing in section 405(h): 
  
No action against the United States . . . or any officer or 
employee thereof shall be brought under section 1331 or 
1346 of Title 28 to recover on any claim arising under this 
subchapter.82
 
 In a series of cases familiar to administrative law scholars, the 
Supreme Court has attempted to clarify just how far § 405(h)’s 
jurisdictional preclusion goes.83  In particular, the Court has struggled to 
understand whether the prohibition on using § 1331 jurisdiction to recover 
on “any claim arising under this subchapter” covers only challenges to 
particularized benefits decisions or whether it also bars a challenge to a 
general Medicare regulation.  The Court gave the phrase the narrower 
reading in Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians.84  That case 
concerned a statutory and constitutional challenge to a Medicare 
regulation applicable to Part B of the Medicare program, which is an 
optional health care plan that supplements the automatic coverage 
                                                 
81 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 
82 42 U.S.C. § 405(h).  This provision is actually a part of the Social Security Act, which 
sets up a similar scheme for judicial review of Social Security benefits decisions.  The 
Medicare Act provides that section 405 applies to the Medicare Act “to the same extent 
as” it applies to the Social Security Act.  42 U.S.C. § 1395ii. 
83 In addition to the cases discussed in the text below, see Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 
602 (1984); United States v. Erika, Inc., 456 U.S. 201 (1982); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 
U.S. 749 (1975). 
84 475 U.S. 667. 
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 provided by Part A.85  The Court observed that, under the statutory 
provisions governing Part B, if parties dissatisfied with the method for 
calculating benefits could not challenge the regulation in an ordinary § 
1331 action, they would have no forum in which to challenge the 
regulation.86  The Court noted that such a construction of § 405(h) would 
violate the presumption of judicial review and would give rise to a 
“serious constitutional question” in that it would bar consideration of 
constitutional challenges to the methods for calculating benefits under Part 
B.87  The Court avoided this question by construing § 405(h) not to bar 
challenges to the validity of Medicare regulations.88
 The Court reached a different result, however, when Section 405(h) 
came before it again in Shalala v. Illinois Council on Long Term Care, 
Inc.89  Once again, the case concerned a general challenge to the Medicare 
regulations, this time under Part A.  This time, however, the Court 
determined that § 405(h) barred the challenge.  The language of § 405(h), 
the Court observed, made no distinction between fact-specific challenges 
to particular benefits decisions and legal challenges to regulations.90  
Moreover, the Court noted, the case did not present a situation in which 
holding Medicare’s specialized review provisions to be exclusive would 
deprive the plaintiffs of any forum in which to seek review.91
 The result of these cases is this:  a challenge to a Medicare regulation 
may or may not constitute a “claim arising under” the Medicare program 
within the meaning of § 405(h), depending on whether or not the 
application of the § 405(h) bar would create a situation in which there 
would be no forum in which the challenge could receive any review. The 
Court chose to limit the application of the constitutional avoidance 
principle to cases in which the constitutional concern actually exists, even 
though doing so required treating the phrase “claim arising under this 
subchapter” as a polymorphic operator.92
                                                 
85 Id. at 668, 674-75. 
86 476 U.S. at 679-81. 
87 476 U.S. at 681 n.12. 
88 Id. at 680.  Congress subsequently amended the Act to provide for more judicial review 
under Part B.  42 U.S.C. § 1395ff. 
89 529 U.S. 1 (2000). 
90 Id. at 13-14. 
91 529 U.S. at 17-20. 
92 The dissenters called attention to this point.  Justice Scalia argued that there was no 
“basis for holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1395ii has a different meaning with regard to Part A 
than with regard to Part B.” 529 U.S. at 32 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Justice Thomas 
claimed that the Court had confused the constitutional avoidance motivation of Michigan 
Academy with the case’s holding that § 405(h) did not bar challenges to Medicare 
- 21 - 
   
 c.  Tacit Polymorphism:  the National Labor Relations Act 
 A final example of constitutional avoidance polymorphism illustrates 
the phenomenon of “tacit polymorphism.”  This phenomenon occurs when 
a court, in effect, applies the polymorphic principle to statutory text, but 
does so without expressly interpreting any particular statutory text.
 National Labor Relations Board v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago93 
presented the questions of whether the National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA) covers the employment relationship between a religious school 
and its teachers, and whether, if so, the Act is constitutional.94  The 
Supreme Court avoided the second question by applying the constitutional 
avoidance principle to the first.  Rather than “resolve difficult and 
sensitive questions arising out of the guarantees of the First Amendment 
Religion Clauses,”95 the Court determined that the statute did not cover 
teachers at religious schools. 
 But what about other employees at religious schools?  The Court’s 
opinion, which focused heavily on the “unique role of the teacher in 
fulfilling the mission of a church-operated school,”96 seemed to leave open 
the possibility that the NLRA might cover a religious school’s other 
employees.  A subsequent Ninth Circuit opinion, National Labor 
Relations Board v. Hanna Boys Center,97 held that the NLRA does indeed 
require religious schools to bargain collectively with employees such as 
child-care workers, cooks, and maintenance workers.98
 The different outcomes of Catholic Bishop and Hanna Boys Center 
could make perfect sense as applications of the Free Exercise Clause, but 
both of these cases purport to be interpreting the NLRA, not the 
Constitution.99  As a matter of statutory interpretation, these cases appear 
to involve the polymorphic principle.  Religious schools, the courts appear 
to be saying, are sometimes “employers” subject to the NLRA and 
sometimes not. 
                                                                                                                         
regulations.  Id. at 39 (Thomas, J., dissenting).    
93 440 U.S. 490 (1979). 
94 Id. at 491. 
95 440 U.S. at 507. 
96 Id. at 501. 
97 940 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1991). 
98 Id. at 1302-03. 
99 See Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 504 (“We therefore turn to an examination of the 
National Labor Relations Act to decide whether it must be read to confer jurisdiction . . 
.”);  Hanna Boys Center, 940 F.2d at 1302 (“We are not constrained, . . . as the Supreme 
Court was in Catholic Bishop, to construe the NLRA more narrowly than its plain 
language invites.”). 
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  The polymorphism is, however, tacit.  In Catholic Bishop, the 
Supreme Court, possibly to avoid acknowledging the degree to which it 
was glossing statutory language, or possibly just because of the loose 
interpretive practices of the era,100 made no reference to any particular 
statutory text.101  Hanna Boys Center, similarly, quoted no statutory 
language.102  The courts’ failure to discuss the statutory text at all 
concealed their need to treat the NLRA’s terms as polymorphic operators 
in order to avoid First Amendment questions.  There is not a hint of an 
exemption for religious schools in the NLRA’s text, and certainly no hint 
of a partial exemption.  In effect, the courts created a partial exemption by 
holding that church-operated schools sometimes are, and sometimes are 
not, “employers” within the meaning of the Act.103   When a court simply 
superimposes a constitutional overlay onto statutory text without 
considering the interpretive problems involved, and the result is 
effectively to impose multiple meanings on statutory terms, the court may 
be said to engage in “tacit” polymorphism.104   
  
 2.  “Subconstitutional” Polymorphism 
 A second motivation for application of the polymorphic principle 
occurs when, even though a statute, under any possible interpretation, 
would be perfectly constitutional, the statute nonetheless treads in an area 
where constitutional concerns have given rise to a special rule of statutory 
                                                 
100 The 1970s, in retrospect, appear as a period in which the Supreme Court was 
particularly apt to follow the sarcastic interpretive maxim that when the legislative 
history is ambiguous, it is permitted to consider the statutory text.  Cf. Scalia, supra note 
5, at 31. 
101 After saying that it would “turn to an examination of the National Labor Relations 
Act,” 440 U.S. at 504, the Court in fact said only this:  “Admittedly, Congress defined the 
Board’s jurisdiction in very broad terms; we must therefore examine the legislative 
history of the Act to determine whether Congress contemplate that the grant of 
jurisdiction would include teachers in [church-operated] schools.” Id.  
102 940 F.2d at 1300-02. 
103 Cf. 440 U.S. at 511 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (describing the Court’s ruling as creating 
“one more exception” to the statutory definition of “employer”). 
104 It might be possible to avoid polymorphism by characterizing the holding of Catholic 
Bishop as an interpretation of the term “employee” in the NLRA, rather than “employer,” 
if the reading were, “an employee other than a teacher at a religious school.”  The 
problem, however, is that a sufficiently nuanced interpretation could always make it 
appear that a court or judge is following the unitary principle—Justice Ginsburg’s 
opinion in Vermont Agency, for example, could be explained by imagining that she 
regards the term “person” in the False Claims Act as meaning “a person other than a state 
entity being sued by a qui tam relator.” The essence of the unitary principle, however, is 
that a statutory term should receive a single construction that is not dependent on factual 
changes that implicate other statutory terms.   
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 interpretation, such as a “clear statement” rule.  Such a special interpretive 
rule may apply to one application of a statutory provision but not others.  
In such cases, courts face the question of whether, as the Court put it in 
Martinez, “[t]he lowest common denominator . . . must govern.”105
 The answer is—not always.  For example, Library of Congress v. 
Shaw106 concerned the question of whether a court may award interest on 
attorney’s fees awarded to a federal employee under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964.107  The Act’s fee-shifting provision provides that a 
court may allow a prevailing party (other than the United States), “a 
reasonable attorney’s fee” and provides for the United States to be liable 
“the same as a private person.”108  Even though the provision for a 
“reasonable attorney’s fee” allows a court to award interest on attorney’s 
fees against a private defendant,109 the Court determined that this same 
phrase does not provide for interest on attorney’s fees against the United 
States.     
 This polymorphic interpretation stemmed from the special, 
subconstitutional interpretive rules applicable to waivers of sovereign 
immunity.  It would not be unconstitutional for Congress to allow courts 
to award interest against the United States, because Congress may waive 
the federal government’s sovereign immunity.  Nonetheless, the issue of 
sovereign immunity gives rise to special concerns.  Because waiver of 
sovereign immunity is a legislative prerogative,110 courts endeavor to 
avoid creating any waiver not approved by Congress, by applying the 
interpretive principle that waivers of federal sovereign immunity must be 
strictly construed.111  Moreover, awards of interest against the federal 
government are particularly disfavored.  Such awards are subject to the 
“no-interest rule,” a further interpretive principle that is even more 
stringent than the already strict principle of construction generally 
applicable to waivers of federal sovereign immunity.112  
 In light of this stringent interpretive principle, the Court determined in 
Shaw that it could not interpret Title VII’s allowance of a “reasonable” 
                                                 
105 125 S. Ct. at 724. 
106 478 U.S. 310 (1986). 
107 As amended in 1972, Title VII provides federal employees as well as private 
employees with protection against employment discrimination.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16. 
108 5 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). 
109 478 U.S. at 313. 
110 E.g., Schillinger v. U.S., 155 U.S. 163, 166 (1894).  
111 E.g., Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996). 
112 Shaw, 478 U.S. at 318 (“The no-interest rule provides an added gloss of strictness” 
upon the usual rules for interpreting waivers of sovereign immunity). 
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 attorney’s fee as providing for interest.113  In so holding, the Court treated 
the phrase “reasonable attorney’s fee” polymorphically.  The phrase 
allowed for interest on attorney’s fees awarded against private parties,114 
but not against the United States.   
 Interestingly, the Court, only three years earlier, had specifically noted 
that the unitary principle may require narrow construction of a fee-shifting 
provision that applies to both private parties and the United States.  In 
Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club,115 in considering the fee-shifting provision of 
the Clean Air Act, the Court noted that the provision “affects fee awards 
against the United States, as well as against private individuals”116 and 
held that it therefore “must be construed strictly in favor of the 
sovereign.”117  Shaw, however, demonstrates that the unitary principle 
applied in Sierra Club is the weak unitary principle.  The Court may apply 
the polymorphic principle in appropriate cases.  Shaw is an example of 
express subconstitutional polymorphism.118
 Another very clear example of express subconstitutional 
polymorphism arises from the well-known civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 
1983.  This statute provides that “[e]very person” who, under color of state 
law, violates someone’s federal rights, “shall be liable to the party injured 
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for 
                                                 
113 Id. at 320. 
114 Id. at 313. 
115 463 U.S. 680 (1983). 
116 Id. at 685. 
117 Id. at 685-86 (internal quotations omitted). 
118 Scholarly fairness requires me to note that the claim that Library of Congress v. Shaw 
applies the polymorphic principle is not quite perfect, because the Court did not have 
occasion to hold that Title VII allows for interest on fee awards against private parties.  It 
is conceivable that the Court meant to leave that question open, and in a later case it 
could have applied the unitary principle to determine that Title VII must be understood to 
deny interest on all fee awards.  Still, the evidence to the contrary is sufficiently strong to 
justify including Shaw in the catalogue of cases applying the polymorphic principle.  
Although the Court does not hold that Title VII permits interest on fee awards against 
private parties, it does state that “[t]he Court of Appeals noted that in a Title VII suit 
against a private employer, interest on attorney’s fees may be recovered.”  478 U.S. at 
313.  This sentence seems approving.  There is no suggestion of the subjunctive; it does 
not appear that the Court reserves the issue or assumes it only arguendo.  The Court 
supports the statement with citation to an actual lower court holding.  Id.  Moreover, after 
Shaw, as before, lower courts and commentators continued to hold or state that Title VII 
permitted interest on attorney’s fees in cases against private defendants. In re Burlington 
Northern, Inc. Employment Practices Litigation, 810 F.2d 601, 609 (7th Cir. 1986); 
CHARLES R. RICHEY, MANUAL ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW AND CIVIL 
RIGHTS ACTIONS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (1988).  Thus, lower courts and commentators 
understood Shaw to have treated the phrase “reasonable attorney’s fees” polymorphically.  
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 redress.”119  In Will v. Michigan Department of State Police,120 the 
Supreme Court determined that a state officer acting in an official capacity 
both is and is not a “person” within the meaning of this statute.  In light of 
the principle that Congress must act clearly when it desires to “alter the 
usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal 
Government,”121 the Court held that a state official acting in an official 
capacity is not a “person” within the meaning of section 1983 when sued 
for damages.122  In a footnote, however, the Court observed that “of 
course” such an official “when sued for injunctive relief, would be a 
person under § 1983.”123  Thus, a state officer sued officially is not a 
person in connection with § 1983’s provision for an “action at law” but is 
a person in connection with the provision for a “suit in equity.”124
 
 3.  Policy Polymorphism 
 Sometimes, the motivation for application of the polymorphic 
principle appears to arise simply from the court’s perception that the result 
of applying the unitary principle will be undesirable as a policy matter.  In 
such cases, courts construe statutory text in such different ways as is 
necessary under different circumstances so as to achieve desirable results. 
 Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, mentioned above in connection 
with the Bossier Parish case,125 provides a good example.  As noted 
earlier, section 5 permits judicial preclearance of a proposed change in 
voting procedures provided the change “does not have the purpose and 
                                                 
119 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added). 
120 491 U.S. 58 (1989). 
121 491 U.S. at 65 (internal quotation omitted). 
122 Id. at 71. 
123 Id. at 71 n.10 (emphasis added). 
124  Subconstitutional polymorphism also occurs in implied form in connection with the 
application of the rule of lenity to “mixed” statutes that impose civil and criminal liability 
on the same conduct.  In the well-known case of FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 
726 (1978) (the “seven dirty words” case), for example, the Supreme Court had to 
construe the statutory prohibition of “indecent” radio broadcasts.   This prohibition is 
contained in a criminal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1464, but the Communications Act also 
authorizes the FCC to revoke the license of or to impose a civil penalty upon a station 
that violates the prohibition.  47 U.S.C. §§ 312, 503.  In construing the meaning of 
“indecent,” the Court remarked that “the validity of the civil sanctions is not linked to the 
validity of the criminal penalty.  . . . [W]e need not consider any questions relating to the 
possible application of § 1464 as a criminal statute.”  438 U.S. at 739 n.13.  As the 
dissent pointed out, this reasoning was inconsistent with the strong unitary principle.  Id. 
at 780 n.8 (Stewart, J., dissenting).  The Court’s refusal to consider the potential 
application of the statute in criminal cases constitutes an implied polymorphism. 
125 See supra Part I.A. 
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 will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on 
account of race or color.”126  Bossier Parish applied the unitary principle 
to conclude that the phrase “denying or abridging the right to vote on 
account of race or color” should have the same meaning whether it is 
triggered by the “purpose” or “effect” prong of section 5.127
 As Bossier Parish acknowledged, however, an earlier case, City of 
Richmond v. United States,128 took a polymorphic approach to section 5.  
Richmond concerned a city’s annexation of additional land.  The 
annexation lowered the percentage of African-Americans in the city from 
52% to 42%.  The Court held that the annexation did not have the 
forbidden effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of 
race.  Almost every annexation, the Court observed, causes some change 
in a city’s racial composition.129  So long as the postannexation voting 
system provides for fair representation of racial minorities, the Court held, 
an annexation does not have the “effect” forbidden by section 5.130
 Nonetheless, the Court held that section 5 imposed the further 
requirement that an annexation be supported by a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory purpose.131  If the only purpose of an annexation were 
to reduce the percentage of a racial minority group in a city’s population, 
the Court held, the annexation would violate section 5.  The Court was 
quite aware that its holding meant that section 5 would have different 
meanings with regard to its “purpose” prong and its “effect” prong.  The 
Court pointedly observed that: 
 
[I]t may be asked how it could be forbidden by § 5 to have 
the purpose and intent of achieving only what is a perfectly 
legal result under that section.132   
 
The Court answered its own question on policy grounds: 
 
The answer is plain, and we need not labor it.  An official 
action, whether an annexation or otherwise, taken for the 
purpose of discriminating against Negroes on account of 
their race has no legitimacy at all under our Constitution or 
                                                 
126 5 U.S.C. § 1973c; see Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd., 528 U.S. 320 (2000). 
127 See supra Part I.A. 
128 422 U.S. 358 (1975). 
129 422 U.S. at 368. 
130 Id. at 371. 
131 Id. at 375. 
132 422 U.S. at 373. 
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 under the statute.  . . .  An annexation proved to be of this 
kind and not proved to have a justifiable basis is forbidden 
by § 5, whatever its actual effect may have been or may 
be.133
 
 Richmond provides an example of express policy polymorphism.  The 
words “denying or abridging the right to vote” have one meaning with 
regard to effects and a different meaning with regard to purpose.134  
Indeed, in Bossier Parish the Court itself “acknowledged that Richmond 
created a discontinuity between the effect and purpose prongs of § 5.”135  
Thus, section 5 provides not only an example of express polymorphism, 
but an expressly judicially acknowledged example.136  
 
                                                 
133 422 U.S. at 378-79. 
134 The Court adhered to this polymorphic interpretation a decade later in City of Pleasant 
Grove v. United States, 479 U.S. 462 (1987).  In that case, it was particularly clear that 
the city’s proposed annexation could not have a retrogressive effect on the voting rights 
of racial minority groups, because the city, prior to the annexation, had no minority 
voters.  Id. at 465, 470-71.  Nonetheless, the Court held that the annexation could not be 
precleared under section 5 because the city had not demonstrated that the annexation 
lacked the purpose of diluting minority voting strength.  Id. at 472.   
135 528 U.S. at 330. 
136 Another excellent example of policy polymorphism (at the lower court level) comes 
from the patent statute.  The Patent Act requires that a patent issue only to an invention 
that is new, useful, and not obvious.  35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103.  The requirement that 
the invention be “new” is embodied in a complex set of rules in § 102, which have 
received remarkable and sometimes tortured interpretations.   See ROGER E. SCHECHTER 
& JOHN R. THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 323 (2003) (“the statute cannot be read in 
isolation from the array of judicial precedent that has interpreted nearly each of its 
words”).  Among these interpretations, at least one is polymorphic:  the interpretation of 
the requirement, in § 102(b), that a patent may not issue if the claimed invention was in 
“public use” for more than a year prior to the patent application date.  Metallizing 
Engineering Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1946), 
presented the question of whether this provision bars a patent for a manufacturing process 
if the patent applicant used the process in secret but sold the product of the process before 
the critical date.  Speaking through Learned Hand, the court said yes, and it justified its 
opinion on the policy ground that a patentee should not be allowed to extend the term of 
the patent monopoly by secretly practicing the process in a way that gives a competitive 
advantage.  Id. at 520.  But in the later case of W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc. v. Garlock, 
Inc., 721 F.2d 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1983), the court held that if someone other than the patent 
applicant is doing exactly the same thing (i.e., using the process secretly and selling the 
product), that does not constitute a “public use” within the meaning of § 102(b), because 
“[a]s between a prior inventor who benefits from a process by selling its product but . . . 
keeps the process from the public, and a later inventor who promptly files a patent 
application . . ., the law favors the latter.”  Id. at 1550.  Thus, secretly practicing a process 
and selling the output both is and is not a “public use” of the process within the meaning 
of § 102(b), depending on who does it.  
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  4.  “Stare Decisis” Polymorphism 
 One last motivation for use of the polymorphic principle arises when a 
court disagrees with a prior case interpreting a statute, but desires to 
adhere to the case as a matter of precedent.  The doctrine of stare decisis 
operates with particular force in statutory interpretation because the 
legislature can always correct what it perceives to be erroneous 
interpretations of its statutes.137  However, a court might desire to avoid 
having a prior error control a statute’s further applications.  Confining the 
effect of prior errors may be possible only through application of the 
polymorphic principle. 
 Once again, section 5 of the Voting Rights Act provides an example.  
When the Court, in Bossier Parish, applied the unitary principle to 
conclude that section 5’s prohibition on judicial preclearance of voting 
changes “denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or 
color” has the same meaning with regard to both a change’s “effect” and 
its “purpose,”138  four Justices dissented.  Justice Souter’s opinion, joined 
by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, expressed disagreement with 
the prior holding, in Beer v. United States, that a voting change that 
diluted minority votes had an “effect” forbidden by section 5 only if the 
change was retrogressive.139  Because Justice Souter “adhere[d] to the 
strong policy of respecting precedent in statutory interpretation,” he stated 
that he would not reexamine Beer itself.140  He also, however, stated that 
“that policy does not demand that recognized error be compounded 
indefinitely.”141  He therefore advocated “[g]iving wider scope to purpose 
than to effect under § 5.”142  Though only a minority opinion, Justice 
Souter’s opinion provides a clear example of express stare decisis 
polymorphism. 
 
 5.  Polymorphism in Constitutional Interpretation 
 Finally, although this Article is primarily concerned with the 
polymorphic principle in statutory interpretation, it is worth noting that the 
Supreme Court has also applied the polymorphic principle when 
interpreting the Constitution.  The Commerce Clause provides that 
Congress shall have power to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, 
                                                 
137 Amy Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts of Appeals, 73 Geo. Wash. 
L. Rev. 317, 317 (2005). 
138 Bossier Parish, 528 U.S. at 329. 
139 528 U.S. at 342 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
140 Id. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. at 368. 
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 and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”143  The words 
“regulate Commerce” appear but once, yet the Supreme Court has 
interpreted the commerce power differently as it applies to foreign 
commerce, interstate commerce, and commerce with the Indian Tribes.144  
This appears to be a policy polymorphism. 
 
 *    *    *    *    * 
 
 In sum, numerous cases—far more than could be dismissed as mere 
errors, outliers, or aberrations—refute the Supreme Court’s claim that the 
polymorphic principle is “novel.”145  Although the courts, in accordance 
with the weak unitary principle, presume that a single phrase in a single 
statutory provision has a single meaning, this presumption is defeasible.  
In appropriate cases, the Supreme Court, lower courts, and individual 
judges and Justices have all applied the polymorphic principle, expressly, 
impliedly, and tacitly.  The examples given above make clear the 
motivation for use of the polymorphic principle:  it comes into play when 
some special motivation—based perhaps in the Constitution, in 
subconstitutional principles, or in pure policy—requires a special 
construction of one application of a statute, and the court desires to 
prevent that special motivation from spilling over into all applications.  
While the polymorphic principle applies only infrequently, it is established 
in the cases of the federal courts at all levels. 
 
III.  THE POLYMORPHIC PRINCIPLE AND THE JUDICIAL 
  ROLE 
 
 So much, then, for the Supreme Court’s claim that the polymorphic 
principle is “novel.”  But what about the claim that it is “dangerous”?  The 
previous section demonstrated, as a purely descriptive matter, that courts, 
including the Supreme Court, have (until Martinez) considered themselves 
free to give a single statutory phrase multiple meanings in appropriate, if 
rare, cases.  It remains to consider the polymorphic principle as a 
normative matter and to decide whether it should play a role in statutory 
interpretation. 
 Doing so requires consideration of issues both of practicality and 
                                                 
143 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8. 
144 See, e.g., Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers , Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 434 (1932) 
(“the power when exercised in respect of foreign commerce may be broader than when 
exercised as to interstate commerce”).  For a full analysis of this polymorphism, see 
Prakash, supra note 6, at 1165-72. 
145 Clark v. Martinez, 125 S. Ct. at 725 
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 theory.  The choice between the polymorphic principle and the strong 
unitary principle, like so many issues of statutory interpretation, implicates 
the most general questions regarding the proper judicial role.  As this Part 
shows, the Court’s decision to stake out a claim for the strong unitary 
principle is inextricably tied to Justice Scalia’s sustained campaign to limit 
the judicial role in statutory interpretation.  The choice for the 
polymorphic principle ultimately rests on an understanding of the error in 
Justice Scalia’s position.  
 This Part first examines whether the strong unitary principle makes 
sense either as a purely linguistic matter or as a matter of the general 
principles applicable to the canons of statutory construction.  After 
concluding that both of these approaches in fact support the polymorphic 
principle, this Part turns to the heart of the likely reason for Justice 
Scalia’s embrace of the strong unitary principle:  his view that the 
principle is demanded by the separation of powers.  This Part attempts to 
demonstrate that the judicial role properly encompasses the degree of 
judicial choice required by the polymorphic principle. 
 
 A.  A Pure Linguistic Approach  
 The strong unitary principle tacitly assumes that it is simply 
impossible for a single term or phrase in a single statutory provision to 
have multiple meanings in different circumstances.146  However, as a 
purely linguistic matter, it is possible, though admittedly uncommon, for a 
single term in a single sentence to have multiple meanings.  In the 
sentence, “I ran ten miles on Monday and a marathon on Thursday,” the 
word “ran” has the same meaning with regard to both the ten-mile run and 
the marathon, but in the sentence, “I ran ten miles on Monday and the 
Marathon Oil Company on Thursday,” the word evidently means one 
thing with regard to the ten miles and something quite different with 
regard to Marathon.  A similar effect is apparent in the famous riposte of 
John Wilkes, who, upon being told by the Earl of Sandwich that he would 
die either on the gallows or of the pox, replied, “that depends, my Lord, 
upon whether I embrace your principles, or your mistress.”147  Evidently 
the single word “embrace” bears two different senses in this sentence.148
 This kind of double entendre is not only uncommon but is usually, as 
                                                 
146 Cf. Martinez, 125 S. Ct. at 723 (“the statute can be construed ‘literally’ to authorize 
indefinite detention . . . or . . . it can be read to ‘suggest [less than] unlimited discretion’ 
to detain . . . . It cannot, however, be interpreted to do both at the same time.”). 
147 See JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 368 (15th ed. 1980) (giving the quotation 
in slightly different form).  This quotation is often attributed to Benjamin Disraeli (who is 
said to have given it in reply to William Gladstone), but I take Bartlett as the reliable 
arbiter of these matters.   
148 For other examples, see Prakash, supra note 6, at 1157-58.  
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 these examples show, an attempt at humor (Wilkes’s attempt being rather 
more successful than my own).  Humor is not a quality one typically 
associates with statutes, so it seems appropriate to assume, as a general 
matter, that a legislature has not created statutory double entendres.149  But 
it is not linguistically impossible for a single term in a single sentence to 
bear multiple meanings.  One must look to something other than the rules 
of the English language to find a principle that a single term in a single 
statutory provision must always bear a single meaning. 
 
 B.  A Canonical Approach  
 The strong unitary principle also finds little support in the general 
practices associated with canons of statutory interpretation.  Indeed, the 
general practices cut strongly against it.  The Supreme Court has 
confirmed countless times that “canons of construction are no more than 
rules of thumb that help courts determine the meaning of legislation.”150  
The canons create presumptions, but they are defeasible presumptions.  
The strong unitary principle is strangely—and unwisely—different.   
 Consider, for example, the closely related canon that courts will 
presume that a word or phrase used multiple times within a single statute 
has the same meaning each time.  The Supreme Court has stated this 
canon innumerable times.151  Yet in ordinary speech the same word may 
certainly bear different meanings when used twice, even within a single 
sentence (“We must all hang together, or assuredly we shall all hang 
separately”),152 and in statutory interpretation the Court has always 
recognized that the canon is only one guide to statutory meaning that other 
indications may overcome, even when the multiple uses of a single term 
are statutorily proximate and exactly parallel. 
                                                 
149 See id. at 1158 (noting that one does not expect to find double entendres in the 
Constitution). 
150 Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992). 
151 E.g., National Aeronautics and Space Admin. v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 
527 U.S. 229, 235 (1999); Commissioner v. Lundy, 516 U.S. 235, 250 (1996); Gustafson 
v. Alloyd Co., Inc., 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995); Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 
(1994); Department of Revenue of Ore. v. ACF Industries, Inc., 510 U.S. 332, 342, 
(1994); Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135,  143 (1994);  Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos 
Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 479 (1992); Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 484 (1990); 
Sorenson v. Secretary of Treasury, 475 U.S. 851, 860 (1986); Erlenbaugh v. United 
States, 409 U.S. 239, 243 (1972); Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U.S. 
427, 433 (1932). 
152  BARTLETT, supra note 147, at 348 (quoting Benjamin Franklin).  Between Wilkes and 
Franklin, we can see that politicians, who, after all, are responsible for legislation, are 
particularly adept at bringing out the multiple meanings that words may have. 
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  For example, in Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States,153 the 
Supreme Court considered the application of section 3 of the Sherman 
Anti-Trust Act.  Section 1 of the Act declares illegal: 
 
[e]very contract, combination, . . . or conspiracy, in 
restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, or 
with foreign nations[.]154   
 
Section 3 declares illegal: 
 
[e]very contract, combination, . . . or conspiracy, in 
restraint of trade or commerce in any Territory of the 
United States or of the District of Columbia[.]155   
 
The two sections are exactly parallel and the words “trade or commerce” 
appear in them identically, so there would seem to be a particularly strong 
case for expecting the words to have the same meaning in each section. 
 That was precisely the point made by the Atlantic Cleaners 
defendants, who were alleged to have violated section 3 by restraining 
trade or commerce in the District of Columbia.  They asserted that section 
1 of the Act was necessarily limited by the scope of Congress’s power 
under the Commerce Clause, and that their conduct, which involved only 
the provision of services, not trade in goods, was beyond the scope of the 
commerce power and therefore could not have constituted “trade or 
commerce” within the meaning of section 1.  Because section 3 uses 
exactly the same words, the defendants asserted that their conduct could 
not constitute “trade or commerce” within the meaning of section 3 either. 
 The Supreme Court rejected this argument.  Although acknowledging 
that the two sections used the same words and that “[u]ndoubtedly, there is 
a natural presumption that identical words used in different parts of the 
same act are intended to have the same meaning,”156 the Court also noted 
that “the presumption is not rigid.”157   The Court observed that, whereas 
Congress’s power over interstate and foreign commerce is limited by the 
Commerce Clause, Congress has plenary power over all matters, including 
commerce, in the District of Columbia.  Therefore, the Court was “free to 
interpret section 3 dissociated from section 1 as though it were a separate 
                                                 
153 286 U.S. 427 (1932). 
154 15 U.S.C. § 1. 
155 15 U.S.C. § 3. 
156 286 U.S. at 433. 
157 Id. 
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 and independent act” and to hold the defendants liable under section 3, 
even assuming arguendo that their conduct could not violate section 1.158  
(The case thus provided a differentiation between the meanings of the one 
term in the two sections that was akin to “constitutional avoidance” 
polymorphism as described above.159)  Many subsequent opinions have 
confirmed that identical words in different sections of the same act may 
have different meanings in appropriate circumstances.160
 Atlantic Cleaners demonstrates the important principle that the canons 
of statutory construction should be a court’s servant, not its master.  The 
reason is clear:  the canons are general, but judicial action is 
particularized.  The general advice embodied in the canons, which are 
designed to cover the entire range of possible statutes, cannot anticipate 
every possible circumstance in which the canons might come into play.  
To reach sound results, courts must be free to determine, in appropriate 
cases, that a particular statute does not conform to the general canons.161  
The strong unitary principle violates this rule by tying a court’s hands. 
 Moreover, given the defeasible nature of the other canons, the strong 
unitary principle introduces a strange discontinuity to the law of statutory 
construction.  It places dispositive weight on what would appear to be 
purely arbitrary congressional drafting choices.  For example, at the time 
Congress passed the Sherman Act, it might have drafted it just a little 
differently:  it might have combined sections 1 and 3 to produce a single 
section that declared illegal “every contract, combination, or conspiracy in 
restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, with foreign 
nations, in any Territory of the United States, or in the District of 
Columbia.”  Surely a Member of Congress would have expected it to 
make no difference whether one statutory section prohibited restraint of all 
four categories of trade or commerce, whether the first two categories 
appeared in one section and the other two in a separate but exactly parallel 
section, or whether each category had its own section.  This seems a 
purely arbitrary choice, and it would be a strange jurisprudence that would 
allow courts to exercise sound judgment in deciding whether to 
differentiate the meaning of identical words appearing in two different 
sections but absolutely forbid such judgment when words appear in one 
                                                 
158 286 U.S. at 435. 
159 See supra Part II.B.1. 
160 E.g., General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 595-96 (2004), 
and cases cited therein.  
161 Cf. Eskridge, supra note 5, at 1101-03 (concluding, after analysis of early practice, 
that “application of the various textualist canons of statutory construction is anything but 
mechanical” and that canons “ought not be applied without consideration of statutory 
goals and purposes, as well as other legal values”). 
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 section but have two different applications.  Judicial discretion in the 
former case is universally accepted and should apply equally to the 
latter.162
 
 C.  The Separation of Powers Approach 
 Given that the polymorphic principle is possible linguistically, makes 
sense pragmatically, and treats the unitary principle the same as other 
canons of statutory construction instead of giving it a unique and 
problematic character, why did the Supreme Court reject it in Martinez?  
Why would the Court so determinedly handcuff itself to a canon?  In 
seeking the answer to this question we find the true heart of the debate 
between the polymorphic principle and the strong unitary principle. 
 The answer is intimately tied up with the identity of the author of the 
Martinez opinion:  Justice Scalia.  Justice Scalia is engaged in a sustained 
campaign to limit judicial choice.  He sees limiting judicial choice as a 
necessary aspect of the separation of powers.  For him, the polymorphic 
principle represents not merely an inferior method of construing statutory 
text but a violation of the limited judicial role in our system of 
government.  
 This section addresses the polymorphic principle from a separation of 
powers perspective.  After first explaining Justice Scalia’s perspective, 
this section explains its error.  First, it is a mistake to believe that the 
judicial role cannot involve the kind of choice that the polymorphic 
principle requires courts to make; second, in any event, that degree of 
judicial choice is inevitable and efforts to restrict it must ultimately prove 
illusory; and third, ironically, the strong unitary principle has the effect of 
magnifying the role of judicial choice in statutory interpretation. 
 
 1.  Justice Scalia and Judicial Choice 
 Justice Scalia is the Supreme Court’s most persistent and doctrinaire 
thinker with regard to matters of statutory interpretation.  Though he is 
most prominently identified with his long campaign against the use of 
legislative history,163 this effort is but a part of his larger campaign against 
judicial choice.  Justice Scalia consistently argues for limiting the judicial 
                                                 
162 Cf. Vermeule, supra note 6, at 1180.  Vermeule makes a similar observation about the 
Constitution’s Commerce Clause:  the Framers might have drafted it just a little 
differently, and provided three Commerce Clauses instead of one Commerce Clause with 
three subclauses, without, in all likelihood, thinking that they were making a crucial 
decision about the clause’s meaning.  Yet under the strong unitary principle, “slight 
variations in organizational structure have substantial effects on meaning.”  Id. 
163 Justice Scalia has long argued against the use of legislative history in statutory 
interpretation, and he has carried his campaign to the point of refusing to join any portion 
of an opinion that relies on legislative history, even if he joins the rest of the opinion. 
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 role in our system of government. 
 Justice Scalia has criticized the adulation given to the “great judge” of 
the common-law era as inappropriate for a modern, democratic society in 
which most law is statutory.164  Judges, he argues, should not approach 
statutes with the “Mr. Fix-it mentality” of the common law judge, whose 
goal is to determine the most desirable outcome of a particular case and to 
evade any impediments to its achievement.165  Judges must recognize that 
their lack of political accountability makes any lawmaking by them at best 
uncomfortable in a democracy, and they must avoid the “usurpation” that 
would follow from approaching statutes with a common-law judge’s 
mentality.166
 Most of Justice Scalia’s specific prescriptions with regard to statutory 
interpretation, although often supported by numerous different arguments, 
find their roots in this core notion of limiting judicial choice.  Justice 
Scalia supports textualism as the prime method of statutory interpretation; 
he argues that courts are bound by the text of statutes rather than by 
legislative intent in part because “under the guise or even the self-delusion 
of pursuing unexpressed legislative intents, common-law judges will in 
fact pursue their own objectives and desires, extending their lawmaking 
proclivities.”167  He campaigns against the use of legislative history in part 
because it permits too much “manipulability” for the “willful judge,” and 
“facilitate[s] rather than deter[s] decisions that are based upon the courts’ 
policy preferences, rather than neutral principles of law.”168  Justice Scalia 
questions the use of some interpretive canons and presumptions, because 
he questions whether courts have the authority to choose to “interpret the 
laws that Congress passes to mean less or more than what they fairly 
say.”169  All of these interpretive proclivities seek to limit judicial choice. 
 The strong unitary principle naturally fits into Justice Scalia’s 
campaign. If courts can sometimes give a single statutory phrase multiple 
meanings, they must choose when to do so.  To Justice Scalia, this 
amounts to “invent[ing] a statute rather than interpet[ing] one.170  That is, 
he regards the polymorphic principle as “dangerous”171 because it involves 
judicial choice. 
                                                 
164 Scalia, supra note 5, at 7-9, 13. 
165 Id. at 13-14. 
166 Id. at 10, 14. 
167 Id. at 17-18. 
168 Id. at 35-36. 
169 Id. at 29. 
170 125 S. Ct. at 722-23. 
171 Id. at 727. 
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  Justice Scalia’s distaste for judicial choice and his consequent embrace 
of textualism follow from the “faithful agent” model of the judicial role.  
The “faithful agent” model posits that the judicial role in statutory cases is 
solely to act as the faithful agent of the legislature, not to make policy 
choices of its own.172  This model is said to be justified by (perhaps 
mandated by) our constitutional structure and particularly by the concept 
of separation of powers.  The Constitution gives the legislative power to 
the politically accountable Congress; politically unaccountable judges 
have no business making policy choices of the kind that our Constitution 
entrusts to the political branches.  By removing one possible mechanism 
for the exercise of judicial choice, the strong unitary principle serves the 
goal of ensuring that the politically accountable Congress makes the 
policy choices in our society. 
 Of course, the foregoing description may seem like an unfair 
caricature of Justice Scalia and of textualism.  As Professor Manning 
reminds us, even textualists recognize that judges necessarily exercise 
some degree of policymaking discretion when construing ambiguous 
statutory language.173  The essence of modern textualism, according to 
Manning, is not the pretense that statutory language objectively 
determines the answer to every question that might come before a court, 
but the rejection of the view that a court may disregard clear statutory text 
simply because the text departs from a statute’s overall purpose or leads to 
a harsh result.174
 Still, if there is any caricature involved, it is inherent in the adoption of 
the strong unitary principle and in the language of the Martinez opinion.  
                                                 
172 See, e.g., Manning, supra note 5, at 5. 
173 Manning, supra note 11, at 1655; see Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 417 
(1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[A] certain degree of discretion, and thus of lawmaking, 
inheres in most executive or judicial action, and it is up to Congress, by the relative 
specificity or generality of its statutory commands, to determine—up to a point—how 
small or how large that degree shall be.”). 
174 Manning, supra note 11, at 1655-57.  Professor Manning’s project of making 
textualism a workable doctrine of statutory interpretation is admirable (and no one does it 
better), but, in my respectful view, it can never succeed except by abandoning 
textualism’s central premises—i.e., by turning textualism into something other than 
textualism.  I have explained this view in other articles, which show that some degree of 
the judicial power which Manning says textualism rejects is necessary to explain sound 
and generally accepted judicial practices.  See Siegel, supra note 5, at 1045-49 (noting 
the judicial power to depart, in appropriate circumstances, from clear statutory text that 
contradicts strong background principles); Siegel, supra note 11, at 324-35 (noting the 
judicial power, in appropriate circumstances, to correct statutory drafting errors).  The 
recent suggestion of my colleague Jonathan Molot that textualism and other theories of 
statutory interpretation have gradually merged, see Jonathan Molot, The Rise and Fall of 
Textualism (forthcoming), overlooks, I would respectfully suggest, this central point. 
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 What, other than a strong distaste for judicial choice, could explain the 
conclusion that the unitary principle is not merely a sound general 
principle, but an inflexible rule that courts must always follow?  Justice 
Scalia has gone beyond saying that the courts’ policymaking role must be 
limited and interstitial.  On this one point, at least, he regards judicial 
choice as “dangerous” and wholly forbids it.175
 
 2.  Judicial Choice and the “Faithful Agent” Model 
 The chief difficulty with Justice Scalia’s reasoning is that even the 
“faithful agent” model of the judicial role should not bar courts from 
making the kind of choices called for by the polymorphic principle.  The 
constitutional principle of separation of powers unquestionably limits the 
judiciary to a far more modest role than that of making the primary policy 
choices entrusted to the legislature, but the limits are not so strict as to 
wholly eliminate the role of judicial choice, even under the “faithful 
agent” model. 
 Two reasons support this view.  The first is textual and historical.  The 
text of the Constitution does not clearly set forth the judicial role.  It does 
not specify a method of statutory interpretation nor does it spell out the 
judicial role in statutory interpretation.  It does not say that courts are to be 
faithful agents of the legislature.  It simply provides that the federal courts 
shall be vested with the “judicial Power.”176   
 As I and others have argued, this power is best understood in historical 
context.   The “judicial Power” that the Constitution assigns to the courts 
should take at least some of its content from the judicial practices that 
would have been familiar to the Framers and ratifiers.  An analysis of 
those practices shows that, by vesting the courts with the “judicial Power,” 
the Framers and ratifiers would have understood that they were entrusting 
the courts with some degree of discretion.177  Exactly how much discretion 
is an appropriate subject for debate.  From the time of the framing down 
the present day, however, courts have always exercised some power to 
maintain coherence in the law, some power to correct statutory drafting 
errors, and, in general, some power to depart from statutory text.178
 The great trick, of course, is knowing when departure from statutory 
text is appropriate.  I have previously agreed that courts certainly do not 
have power to depart from statutory text at will, nor on the mere ground 
                                                 
175 125 S. Ct. at 727. 
176 U.S. Const. art. III, § 1. 
177 See Siegel, supra note 5, at 1094-98; Eskridge, supra note 5, passim; GUIDO 
CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 91-119 (1982). 
178 See Siegel, supra note 5, at 1094-98; Eskridge, supra note 5, passim; CALABRESI, 
supra note 177, at 91-119. 
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 that particular statutory text leads to a result that appears to conflict with a 
statute’s overall purpose.179  In my view, explained in detail elsewhere, 
background principles of law play a critical role in determining the 
appropriate occasions for exercise of this limited judicial power.  Within 
any field of law there usually exist background principles that make up a 
whole structure of which any one statute forms only a part.  Courts should 
construe statutes in the context provided by these background principles, 
and a startling departure from background principles apparently demanded 
by statutory text may be the clue that indicates the appropriateness of a 
court’s engaging in something other than purely textualist construction.180  
Such judicial action is an essential part of what courts have always done 
and therefore forms a part of the “judicial Power” vested in the federal 
courts. 
 The second point is that this view is fully consistent with the “faithful 
agent” model.  Some scholars reject historical analysis as a guide to the 
judicial role.181  The structure of the Constitution, they assert, renders 
inapt comparisons to judicial practices in England or in states that did not 
have a similar structure of separated powers.182  The separation of powers 
within our constitutional structure, the political accountability of 
Congress, and judges’ lack of political accountability, demand that courts 
act as Congress’s faithful agents. 
 Accepting this view, however, still does not dictate textualism as a 
method of statutory interpretation.  The most faithful agent is not the one 
who slavishly follows the text of a principal’s written instructions, no 
matter what.  Even faithful agents recognize the necessity for departure 
from such instructions on appropriate occasions. 
 Again, I have argued this point in detail elsewhere and will give only a 
brief summary here.  A faithful agent recognizes that some instructions 
from the principal are incorrectly worded.  This point applies to statutory 
interpretation.  Even Justice Scalia recognizes a limited judicial power to 
correct statutory drafting errors—“scrivener’s errors,” he calls them—that 
lead to absurd results, at least when the intended result is obvious.183  A 
judge exercising this corrective power is being a faithful agent of 
Congress, even though the power is really inconsistent with the textualist 
view of statutory interpretation.184  
                                                 
179 Siegel, supra note 5, at 1055-56. 
180 Id. at 1055-57; Siegel, supra note 11, at 348-49. 
181 E.g., Manning, supra note 11, at 1663. 
182 Id. at 1662-65. 
183 See Siegel, supra note 11, at 325-32. 
184 See id. at 333-35. 
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  Once this power is conceded, it becomes clear that the “faithful agent” 
model of the judicial role does not eliminate judicial choice in statutory 
interpretation.  The faithful agent must exercise a sound discretion in 
interpreting the principal’s instructions.  Of course one may properly 
debate how broad a discretion the agent should exercise.  My own view, 
which calls upon courts to take background principles of law as an 
important guide, gives them more freedom than the strictly textualist 
approach, though less than the intentionalist approach.185  The key point, 
however, is that it is an error to reject interpretive methods simply because 
they involve judicial choice.  Such choice may be perfectly consistent with 
the faithful agent model. 
 This analysis of the judicial role matches our intuitive understanding 
of what principals really want their faithful agents to do.  It would be a 
rare principal who truly desired an agent to exercise no judgment in 
determining whether to depart from the text of the principal’s instructions. 
As Lon Fuller famously remarked, “[t]he stupidest housemaid knows that 
. . . when her master tells her to ‘drop everything and come running’ he 
has overlooked the possibility that she is at the moment in the act of 
rescuing the baby from the rain barrel.”186  Or consider again that most 
faithful of agents, the computer.  When your Windows machine crashes, 
you can be sure that it is faithfully executing the exact instructions given 
to it by its programmers.  Few users, however, regard this fidelity to the 
programmers’ instructions as desirable at the moment it happens.  The 
crashing computer is more like a unionized employee engaged in a “work 
to rule” slowdown—another agent who demonstrates that principals do 
not always desire their agents to follow their instructions to the exact 
letter.   
 In any event, it is not really necessary to demonstrate that a faithful 
agent may sometimes depart from a principal’s written instructions in 
order to justify the degree of judicial choice necessary to implement the 
polymorphic principle.  The polymorphic principle does not involve 
departure from statutory text, but only giving statutory text meanings that 
it can bear.  It lies within the ordinary realm of construction open to the 
faithful agent.   
 Consider again the Atlantic Cleaners case mentioned above.  Purely 
linguistic analysis in that case would have strongly suggested that the 
phrase “trade or commerce” had the same meaning in sections 1 and 3 of 
                                                 
185 Siegel, supra note 11, at 348. 
186 Lon L. Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 616, 625 
(1949).  (Actually Fuller is speaking here through his invented character, Judge Foster.  
Id.) 
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 the Sherman Act, where it appears in exactly parallel constructions.187  
The Court, however, properly considered Congress’s purpose in enacting 
the statute, which, it determined, included exercising all the power that 
Congress possessed, so as to deal with restraint of trade or commerce in 
the most comprehensive and effective possible way.188  In light of this 
purpose, the Court determined that it was appropriate to construe sections 
1 and 3 as though they appeared in two separate statutes, with the latter 
construed so as to reflect Congress’s greater power over commerce in the 
District of Columbia.189  As noted above, innumerable cases have 
confirmed the power of a court to give different meanings to multiple 
appearances of a single term in a single statute; no one argues that courts 
doing so are violating their duty to act as faithful agents of Congress. 
 The degree of judicial choice involved in cases of the Atlantic 
Cleaners type is no different from that called for by the polymorphic 
principle.  If a court can treat two sections of the same statute as though 
they appear in two separate, purely notional statutes, it should have a like 
discretion to treat a single section with two subclauses as though it were 
really two separate, notional sections.  At no point does this technique 
require a court to give statutory text a meaning it will not bear.  The 
faithful agent, who may uncontroversially recognize that the same text can 
bear different meanings when appearing multiple times, can on 
appropriate occasions recognize that a single text can bear multiple 
meanings even when appearing a single time. 
 It is an error, therefore, for the Court to attempt to squeeze judicial 
choice out of the interpretive process as strongly as it has by endorsing the 
strong unitary principle.  Even accepting the view that our Constitution 
imposes the “faithful agent” model of interpretation upon the courts, that 
model permits judicial choice that may, on infrequent but appropriate 
occasions, include the choice to depart from statutory text.  It certainly 
permits the even smaller degree of judicial choice called for by the 
polymorphic principle. 
 
 3.  Eliminating Judicial Choice – Reality and Illusion  
 Moreover, even if one accepted the view that courts should use an 
interpretive methodology that eliminates as much judicial choice as 
possible, such a view would still not justify adoption of the strong unitary 
principle.  The strong unitary principle does not really eliminate judicial 
choice.  It just creates the illusion of doing so. 
 Others have argued that Justice Scalia’s textualism, although 
                                                 
187 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 3. 
188 286 U.S. at 435. 
189 Id. 
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 purportedly providing an objective, value-neutral methodology that judges 
can apply to reach determinate answers, in fact creates only the illusion of 
objectivity, while leaving judges ample opportunities for manipulation.190  
This point applies to the strong unitary principle.  Indeed, the very nature 
of the strong unitary principle virtually guarantees that it will be called 
into play to mask, not to eliminate, judicial choice. 
 Any case in which the strong unitary principle makes a real difference 
must be a case in which there is a substantial argument for application of 
the polymorphic principle.  That is, there must be some substantial 
argument for why a court should give a single statutory phrase different 
meanings under different circumstances.  In such a case, even assuming 
the court firmly adheres to the strong unitary principle and restricts itself 
to choosing one, single meaning for the statutory phrase, that is still a 
judicial choice.  Necessarily, it is a significant choice.  If one possible 
meaning for the statutory phrase were simply right and the other simply 
wrong, the court would not need the strong unitary principle to tell it what 
to do; it would just choose the right meaning anyway. 
 There is, therefore, no getting away from judicial choice in cases 
potentially involving the polymorphic principle.  The strong unitary 
principle, to be sure, takes away one particular judicial choice.  Once a 
court interprets the statutory phrase in one case, it is deprived of the power 
to give the phrase a different meaning in the next case.  To that extent, 
choice is reduced.  The effect, however, is simply to raise the stakes as to 
the initial judicial choice.  Justice Scalia’s opinion in Martinez makes this 
clear:  in giving the statutory phrase its initial interpretation, he explains, 
the court “must consider the necessary consequences of its choice.”191  
The court must consider how the interpretation will apply in the full range 
of possible circumstances, including those not presented by the case 
immediately before it,192 and choose one meaning for them all.  That is 
still a choice, and Justice Scalia provides no convincing explanation for 
why one high-stakes judicial choice is better than two judicial choices of 
lesser consequence.   
 Of course, there might be cases in which the contested statutory phrase 
has its meaning clearly controlled in one application by a rule of statutory 
interpretation.  In such cases, perhaps, one could argue that the strong 
unitary principle truly eliminates judicial choice, because the meaning in 
the one application is objectively fixed and the strong unitary principle 
                                                 
190 This argument is developed in William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, the Unknown 
Ideal?, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 1509 (1998); see also Stephen A. Plass, The Illusion and Allure 
of Textualism, 40 Vill. L. Rev. 93 (1995). 
191 125 S. Ct. at 724. 
192 Id. 
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 then extends that meaning to all applications.  But again, if the case is one 
in which the strong unitary principle makes a difference, there must be 
something about the other applications that creates at least some doubt as 
to the clarity of the meaning of the contested statutory phrase, which in 
turn suggests that there really was some judicial choice—a high-stakes 
choice—involved in the initial interpretation.193
 Justice Scalia believes that there is something particularly unworthy 
about searching for exceptions to interpretations previously adopted when 
those interpretations yield an undesirable result in a later case and 
something particularly commendable about sticking to initial decisions in 
such cases.194  Certainly one must credit Justice Scalia with respect for his 
principles in cases such as Martinez, where it seems clear that he 
personally disagreed with the result, which he had previously castigated in 
Zadvydas,195 yet voted for it all the same.  Making exceptions in later 
cases, however, may not reflect unprincipled or arbitrary judging,196 but 
rather a sincere attempt to implement the best interpretation of the statute 
involved; the undesirable result might serve as an indicator that the correct 
implementation of the statute is different in the later case.  If we trust 
judges to make a principled choice in initially interpreting a statute, it is 
not clear why we cannot trust them to make a second principled choice in 
a later case and why we must instead raise the stakes on the initial choice.  
 So the strong unitary principle fails to deliver on its promise of 
reducing judicial choice in statutory interpretation.  It may limit the 
number of times a court must exercise judicial choice, but it 
proportionately raises the stakes with regard to those times. 
  
 4.  The Ratchet Effect of the Strong Unitary Principle 
 Indeed, for those whose goal is to restrict the role of judicial choice, 
the situation is even worse than the previous section suggests.  The strong 
unitary principle would in many cases have the effect of magnifying the 
role of judicial choice in statutory interpretation and of increasing the 
degree to which courts depart from the legislative will.  It would have this 
effect because the strong unitary principle takes the initial judicial choice, 
which may be a highly contestable choice that implements judicial 
wilfulness at the expense of what the legislative has prescribed, and 
compels its application even more broadly than might otherwise be 
required. 
                                                 
193 As the next section shows, this was certainly true in Martinez. 
194  See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chic. L. Rev. 1175, 
1179-80, 1187 (1989). 
195 533 U.S. at 702-05 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
196 See Scalia, supra note 194, at 1179-80. 
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  Consider, for example, the effect of applying the strong unitary 
principle in conjunction with the doctrine of constitutional avoidance.  As 
Justice Thomas observed in his dissenting opinion in Martinez, the 
doctrine of constitutional avoidance takes two forms.197  In one form, 
sometimes called the “narrow” or “classical” doctrine of avoidance, it 
demands only that when a statute has two potential constructions, one of 
which would be constitutional and the other unconstitutional, a court 
should give the statute the constitutional construction.  In the other 
(“broad” or “modern”) form, the doctrine of constitutional avoidance 
requires a court to construe a statute so as to avoid even a substantial 
doubt as to its constitutionality.198
 To the extent that courts invoke the broad doctrine of constitutional 
avoidance, they are engaging in judicial choice.  As Adrian Vermeule has 
observed, the broad doctrine of constitutional avoidance overprotects 
constitutional norms.199  It is one thing to say, as the narrow doctrine of 
avoidance says, that courts must construe statutes so as to avoid actual 
unconstitutionality.  To the extent that courts do so, they take nothing 
away from legislative power that the Constitution has not already taken; 
they merely prevent a statute from having an effect it cannot 
constitutionally have. When courts construe a statute so as to avoid 
constitutional doubt, however, they impinge on the legislative power.  The 
principle of legislative supremacy would demand that courts give effect to 
duly enacted statutes to the full extent permitted by the Constitution.200  
To the extent that courts construe statutes so as to avoid a mere 
constitutional doubt, without actually determining that the statute would 
be unconstitutional under one possible construction, they fail to give effect 
to what might well have been a constitutional exercise of the legislative 
power.   
                                                 
197 125 S. Ct. at 732-33 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
198 See id.  The Court discussed the difference between the two forms of the doctrine in 
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 190-91 (1991).  See also Adrian Vermeule, Saving 
Constructions, 85 Geo. L.J. 1945, 1948-49 (1997) (discussing the difference between the 
two doctrines and giving them the names mentioned in the text).  The “narrow” or 
“classical” doctrine is usually said to be the older and original form, e.g., 125 S. Ct. at 
732 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Vermeule, supra, at 1958-59, and has its roots in cases as 
early as Mossman v. Higginson, 4 U.S. 12 (1800).  The “broad” or “modern” version is 
usually said to have originated in United States ex rel. Attorney General v. Delaware & 
Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909), see Rust, 500 U.S. at 191 (so attributing it); 
Vermeule, supra, at 1958 (same), although as early as 1830 the Court construed a statute 
so as to avoid “the most serious doubts” about the constitutionality of an alternative 
construction.  Parsons v. Bedford, Breedlove & Robeson, 28 U.S. 433, 448 (1830).  
199 Vermeule, supra note 198, at 1963. 
200 Id. at 1963. 
- 44 - 
  Thus, the doctrine of constitutional avoidance is effectively a judicial 
power grab.  To be sure, courts invoke the doctrine in the name of 
Congress—they claim to believe that Congress desires courts to construe 
statutes so as to avoid constitutional issues.201  This attribution of 
congressional desire is, however, implausible.202  It would seem more 
realistic to presume that Congress wants what it enacted in a statute, 
giving that statute its best possible construction (indeed, one might even 
regard such a presumption as constitutionally required whether it is 
realistic or not).  If, under the best construction, the statute is 
unconstitutional, then, of course, Congress cannot get what it wants, but if 
the statute, as best construed, only raises a constitutional doubt, and turns 
out to be constitutional on close examination, it would seem more realistic 
and appropriate to presume that Congress wants the statute enforced.  The 
doctrine of constitutional avoidance would, therefore, appear to be an 
exercise of judicial choice that decreases congressional power. 
 Moreover, the cases show that the avoidance doctrine can have a very 
substantial impact on statutory interpretation.  The doctrine is theoretically 
limited by the rule that courts will give statutes only “fairly possible”203 
constructions and will not “press statutory construction to the point of 
disingenuous evasion even to avoid a constitutional question.”204  In fact, 
however, courts frequently invoke the rule even when doing so requires 
them to give a statute a construction that has no basis whatever in the 
statutory language—as, for example, in Zadvydas, when the Supreme 
Court determined that the statutory provision that certain aliens “may be 
detained beyond the removal period,”205 implicitly limits the Attorney 
General’s authority to detain removable aliens.206  The Supreme Court 
exercised judicial choice in this case, as is evidenced by the 5-4 split 
among the Justices and by the dissent’s complaint about the Court’s 
                                                 
201 See Rust, 500 U.S. at 191 (“This canon is followed out of respect for Congress, which 
we assume legislates in the light of constitutional limitations.”). 
202 Vermeule, supra note 198, at 1962. 
203 Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932). 
204 Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 60 (1997) (internal quotation omitted). 
205 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). 
206 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001); cf. National Labor Relations Board v. 
Catholic Bishop of Chicago,  440 U.S. 490 (1979) (holding that the National Labor 
Relations Act does not cover the relationship between religious schools and their 
teachers); id. at 511 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (pointing out that the Court’s interpretation 
was not “fairly possible”); United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312, 1335 (7th Cir. 1990) 
(Posner, J., dissenting) (noting that courts “often do interpretive handsprings” to avoid a 
constitutional question). 
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 “obvious disregard of congressional intent.”207  Examples such as this one 
show that courts exercise substantial discretion in determining how far to 
go in avoiding constitutional issues.  The doctrine of constitutional 
avoidance is not only an exercise of judicial choice, but it arrogates a 
considerable degree of power to the courts.   
 Now consider how the broad avoidance doctrine interacts with the 
strong unitary principle.  Once a court gives statutory text a particular 
construction in one application in order to avoid constitutional doubt, the 
strong unitary principle demands that that construction apply to all 
applications of the text, even applications that raise no constitutional 
doubt, because the “lowest common denominator” must control.208  The 
result is that the strong unitary principle ratchets up the judicial 
interference with the congressional will.  First, the courts seize power by 
construing a statute under the avoidance principle so as to block its 
possibly constitutional effect; then, the strong unitary principle multiples 
the judicial interference with the congressional enactment by extending 
that construction to other applications of the statute that may not even pose 
any constitutional problem. 
 Zadvydas and Martinez provide an excellent illustration of this effect.  
First, in Zadvydas, the Court invoked the avoidance doctrine to give the 
immigration laws an interpretation that was textually quite implausible, 
but judicially preferable, on the ground that there was some doubt as to the 
constitutionality of indefinite detention of removable aliens.  Justice Scalia 
was among those insisting that the Court had “obvious[ly] disregard[ed] . . 
. congressional intent.”209  Then, in Martinez, the Court applied the strong 
unitary principle to extend that implausible interpretation to the case of 
inadmissible aliens, without even claiming that indefinite detention of 
such aliens would raise any constitutional doubts.210  Thus, the strong 
unitary principle had the effect of extending the violence that the Court 
had initially done to the statute into further applications where it might not 
have been necessary under the avoidance doctrine alone.  
 Similar ratchet effects would follow from applying the strong unitary 
principle in other situations involving an initial judicial choice.  For 
                                                 
207 533 U.S. at 705 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
208 Martinez, 125 S. Ct. at 724. 
209 533 U.S. at 705 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
210 Of course, one might take the view that all indefinite detentions of any person not 
charged with a crime raise at least some constitutional doubt.  Under that view, Martinez, 
although still giving the immigration statute a textually implausible reading, would be no 
worse than Zadvydas.  But in Martinez the Court gave the statute an implausible reading 
without claiming that the natural reading would raise constitutional doubts in the case at 
hand. 
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 example, in Library of Congress v. Shaw, as noted earlier, the Supreme 
Court construed Title VII so as not to provide for interest on attorney’s fee 
awards entered against the United States.211  The Court’s opinion was 
quite implausible as a matter of statutory construction;212 the Court 
reached its result only by applying the countertextual no-interest rule.  If 
the Court had then followed the strong unitary principle, it would have had 
to conclude that interest awards were not available on any attorney’s fees 
awarded under Title VII, whether against a private party or the United 
States.  The initial choice to follow the no-interest rule would have 
significantly interfered with the entire scheme of Title VII, by extending a 
rule applicable only to the federal government into the much larger sphere 
of private employment.213  (In fact, as noted above, the Court applied the 
polymorphic principle.) 
 Thus, not only does the strong unitary principle fail to eliminate 
judicial choice, in many cases it would have the perverse effect of 
magnifying judicial choice.  Once courts make the initial choice to depart 
from congressional intent in the name of some other value served by a 
judicially developed principle of statutory interpretation, the strong unitary 
principle would extend that judicial choice into further statutory 
applications, where it might serve neither the congressional intent nor the 
other, judicially desired value.   
 
 5.  Practical Arguments Concerning the Strong Unitary Principle 
 Two other arguments that one could make—and that Justice Scalia 
probably would make—for the strong unitary principle should also be 
noted:  that clear rules of the kind provided by the principle would reduce 
litigation costs and would provide Congress with a clear background 
against which to legislate.  Justice Scalia has made arguments of this kind 
in connection with other principles of statutory interpretation, such as 
                                                 
211 478 U.S. 310 (1986). 
212Title VII specifically provided for the United States to be liable “the same as a private 
person.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).  Given that courts could award interest on attorney’s 
fees awarded against private parties, it would seem indubitable that the statutory 
language, if given its normal meaning, would subject the United States to such interest 
awards as well.  See 478 U.S. at 324-25 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
213 Indeed, although Shaw involved only interest on attorney’s fees, similar logic would 
have applied to interest against the United States on Title VII back pay awards, which the 
strong unitary principle would then have extended to interest on all Title VII back pay 
awards, including those against private parties.  Such a construction would have 
constituted a serious interference with the policy of Title VII, because back pay is often 
awarded a long time after the wrong involved and the award could be significantly 
degraded by the failure to award interest. 
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 avoiding the use of legislative history.214
 The short answer to these arguments is that these benefits, assuming 
them to exist, have not been thought sufficient, in the case of other canons 
of construction, to overcome the benefit of maintaining judicial flexibility 
to reach the best construction of a particular statute.  As noted earlier, 
other canons, including the closely related canon that words appearing 
multiple times within a single statute are presumed to have the same 
meaning each time, serve as guides, not as inflexible rules.  The 
“standards v. rules” debate is a long-standing one,215 but, at least with 
regard to statutory construction, the usual answer is that general principles 
are too general to merit complete adherence in all cases.   
 The longer answer is that the claimed benefits are also doubtful.  As to 
litigation costs, it seems unlikely that the strong unitary principle could 
become so firmly established that litigants would just give up in cases 
where there is some strong reason to apply the polymorphic principle.  
Courts rarely adhere to even apparently settled principles of statutory 
construction so firmly as to avoid all need for litigation. 216   
 In any event, the choice of the initial statutory interpretation would 
have to be fought out circuit by circuit, until such time as the Supreme 
Court steps in, so there would be no saving there.  Indeed, the strong 
unitary principle might increase litigation costs by increasing the number 
of conflicts that the Supreme Court must resolve.  If the Court took the 
strong unitary principle seriously, then, where a statute says, “if (A or B), 
then C,” a case from one circuit giving C a particular meaning in 
connection with A would have to be regarded as conflicting with a case 
from a different circuit giving C a different meaning in connection with B.  
Under current practice, the two cases might be regarded as a mere “false 
conflict,” but the strong unitary principle would make the conflict a true 
one, putting further strain on the time of the Supreme Court, which is one 
of the system’s scarcest resources. 
 As to the prospect of providing clear rules against which Congress can 
legislate, I have previously argued that this apparently commendable goal 
is something of a chimera.217  Its achievement requires assuming an 
unrealistic degree of perfection in the congressional drafting process.  So 
                                                 
214 On lowering litigation costs, see, e.g., Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) 
(Scalia, J., concurring); on providing Congress with clear rules against which to legislate, 
see, e.g., Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 , 556 (1989) (Scalia, J.).  
215 See generally Scalia, supra note 194. 
216 See infra Part IV.A. 
217 Siegel, supra note 11, at 341-43. 
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 long as we remain human beings, not gods,218 Congress will on occasion 
draft statutes that defy the supposedly “clear” rules of construction.  That 
is why it is best to retain the rules as general guides but not to render them 
completely inflexible.   
  
 *    *    *    *    * 
 In sum, the strong unitary principle is not only incorrect linguistically 
and  a poor fit with general practices with regard to the canons of statutory 
construction, but it does not follow from the separation of powers or the 
“faithful agent” model of the judicial role.  Courts can and do exercise the 
degree of judicial choice called for by the polymorphic principle.  
Moreover, even if one adopted the goal of minimizing judicial choice to 
the extent possible, the strong unitary principle would not follow.  The 
strong unitary principle provides only the illusion of eliminating judicial 
choice.  Indeed, in many cases, it has the ironic effect of magnifying the 
role of judicial choice in the process of statutory construction. 
  
IV.  THE POLYMORPHIC FUTURE 
 
 It remains to consider the future of the polymorphic principle.  This 
Part suggests that, notwithstanding Martinez, the polymorphic principle is 
probably alive and well.  Therefore, this Part attempts to set forth some 
guidelines for its use and to consider the role of Congress in regulating it. 
 
 A. Polymorphism and Stare Decisis   
 Whatever one thinks of the propriety or wisdom of the polymorphic 
principle, one might imagine that Martinez simply resolves the issue.  Has 
the Supreme Court firmly rejected the polymorphic principle and rendered 
discussion of the matter pointless?  Is the issue now determined for future 
cases by stare decisis?   
 Probably not.  To be sure, Martinez’s language appears quite stark.  
The Court (by a solid, 7-2 majority) declares polymorphism to be a 
“dangerous principle.”219  It says that statutory language cannot have two 
meanings at the same time.220  It says that where one statutory application 
calls for ambiguous language to have a limited meaning, a court cannot 
give the same language a broader meaning in a different application; 
rather, the “lowest common denominator . . . must control.”221  Thus, the 
                                                 
218  See Siegel, supra note 5, at 1107 (citing H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 128 (2d 
ed. 1994)).
219 125 S. Ct. at 727. 
220 Id. at 723. 
221 Id. at 724 (emphasis added). 
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 Court seems to have considered the general interpretive issue thoroughly 
and self-consciously and to have set its face against the polymorphic 
principle as squarely as it can. 
 The Supreme Court’s cases, however, strongly suggest that the Court 
lacks real methodological commitments in matters of statutory 
interpretation.  When the Court decides a statutory interpretation case, 
stare decisis effect attaches to the interpretation that the Court gives to a 
statute, but the Court does not adhere to the interpretive methods used to 
reach that interpretation.  Time and again one sees the Court stating a 
principle of statutory interpretation without apparent qualification in one 
case, only to ignore it in the next.   
 Consider, for example, the frequently arising question of whether a 
court may consult a statute’s legislative history when the statute’s text is 
unambiguous.  At times—particularly in cases where it does not really 
matter, because legislative history supports the apparent meaning of 
statutory text—the Supreme Court forbids this practice in apparently 
uncompromising language, such as, “[w]hen the words of a statute are 
unambiguous, . . . judicial inquiry is complete,”222 or “when the statute’s 
language is plain, the sole function of the courts—at least where the 
disposition required by the text is not absurd—is to enforce it according to 
its terms.”223  But in other cases, the Court contents itself with the more 
moderate statement that “[a]bsent a clearly expressed legislative intention 
to the contrary, [statutory] language must ordinarily be regarded as 
conclusive”224 or with noting that only a “most extraordinary showing” of 
intention in legislative history will justify departure from clear statutory 
text.225  In at least some cases where apparently clear statutory text is truly 
at odds with purposes that may be deduced from legislative history, the 
Court unblushingly consults the history.226
                                                 
222 Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 24, 254 (1992) (internal quotation 
omitted); see also id. at 255-56 (Stevens, J., concurring) (explaining that the legislative 
history supports the statutory text). 
223 Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004). 
224 United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 497 (1997) (quoting Consumer Product Safety 
Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980) ). 
225 Salinas v. U.S., 522 U.S. 52, 57 (1997). 
226 E.g., General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 586-89 (2004) 
(consulting legislative history in determining that the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act’s prohibition on “discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual’s age,” 29 U.S.C.A. § 623(a)(1), prohibits only discrimination based on old 
age, not discrimination in favor of older workers and against younger ones); id. at 603 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (complaining that “[t]he plain language of the ADEA clearly 
allows for suits brought by the relatively young when discriminated against in favor of 
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  The Court also issues diametrically opposed pronouncements about 
proper ways of using legislative history in those cases in which it is 
consulted.  For example, the Court has contradicted itself on the question 
of whether, in determining whether a statutory amendment made a 
possibly surprising change in a statutory scheme, a court may rely on the 
absence of any acknowledgment of the change in the amendment’s 
legislative history.  In Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc.,227 the Court 
strongly cautioned against reliance on such “negative” legislative history.  
The Court said, “[i]n ascertaining the meaning of a statute, a court cannot, 
in the manner of Sherlock Holmes, pursue the theory of the dog that did 
not bark.”228  Yet in the later case of Chisom v. Roemer,229 the Court 
rejected a particular statutory construction “because we are convinced that 
if Congress had such an intent, . . . at least some of the Members would 
have identified or mentioned it at some point in the unusually extensive 
legislative history.”230  For good measure, the Court added, “Congress’s 
silence in this regard can be likened to the dog that did not bark.”231  The 
                                                                                                                         
the relatively old.”); see also Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 514-518 & 518 n.12 
(1993) (stating that it is permissible to consult legislative history even where “[t]he 
statutory command . . . is unambiguous, unequivocal, and unlimited”); I.N.S. v. Cardoza-
Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 n.12 (1987) (consulting legislative history even though “the 
plain language of this statute appears to settle the question before us”); United States v. 
American Trucking Assns., Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 543-544 (1940) (“When aid to 
construction of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available, there certainly 
can be no ‘rule of law’ which forbids its use, however clear the words may appear on 
‘superficial examination.’”). 
227 446 U.S. 578 (1980). 
228 Id. at 592. 
229 501 U.S. 380 (1991). 
230 Id. at 396. 
231 Id. at 396 n.23.  Sherlock Holmes enthusiasts will recognize the allusion to Silver 
Blaze, but will also know that the commonplace reference to “the dog that didn’t bark,” 
while more suitable for one-line use than the actual original, loses something of the 
original’s brilliance.  In the original story, Holmes is trying to solve the mysterious 
disappearance of Silver Blaze, a racehorse, which was kidnapped from its stall one night 
shortly before a big race.  In the course of his investigation, Holmes questions a stable 
lad, and learns that several sheep kept by the stable have recently gone lame.  Holmes 
chuckles and calls this “singular epidemic among the sheep” to the attention of the 
official police representative, Inspector Gregory: 
 
 I saw by the Inspector’s face that his attention had been keenly aroused. 
 “You consider that to be important?” he asked. 
 “Exceedingly so.” 
 “Is there any other point to which you would wish to draw my attention?” 
 “To the curious incident of the dog in the night-time.” 
 “The dog did nothing in the night-time.” 
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 Court thus disregarded its specific, apparently unqualified prohibition on 
the use of precisely this interpretive technique, and even its rejection of 
this specific interpretive metaphor. 
 Similarly, the Court has contradicted itself with regard to the role that 
a statute’s overall purpose should play in its interpretation.  In Rodriguez 
v. United States,232 the Court referred to a lower court’s reliance on overall 
purpose as “most impermissibl[e].”233  The Court explained the fallacy 
inherent in such reliance:  “[N]o legislation pursues its purposes at all 
costs. . . . [I]t frustrates rather than effectuates legislative intent 
simplistically to assume that whatever furthers the statute’s primary 
objective must be the law.”234  Just a few years later, however, in Babbitt 
v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon,235 the Court 
rejected a strong textual argument236 by relying in part on “the broad 
purpose” of the statute at hand.237  Justice Scalia plaintively responded, “I 
thought we had renounced the vice of ‘simplistically assum[ing] that 
whatever furthers the statute’s primary objective must be the law.’”238    
 The Court sometimes makes flat statements such as “[i]t is beyond our 
province to rescue Congress from its drafting errors.”239  At other times, 
however, the Court does exactly that.240  Even Justice Scalia accepts that 
courts may correct scrivener’s errors on appropriate, albeit rare, 
occasions.241   
                                                                                                                         
 “That was the curious incident,” remarked Sherlock Holmes. 
Arthur Conan Doyle, Silver Blaze, in 2 WILLIAM S. BARING-GOULD, THE ANNOTATED 
SHERLOCK HOLMES 277 (1967).  The phrase “the dog that didn’t bark” never appears in 
the original story. Thus, “the dog that did nothing” would be a truer reference to the 
original, but even a Sherlockian purist would have to admit that “the dog that didn’t bark” 
makes more sense for an audience that might be unfamiliar with the original story.  Cf. 
MARK HADDON, THE CURIOUS INCIDENT OF THE DOG IN THE NIGHT-TIME (2003). 
232 480 U.S. 522 (1987) (per curiam). 
233 Id. at 525 (emphasis added). 
234 Id. at 525-26. 
235 515 U.S. 687 (1995). 
236 Id. at 715-25 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
237 Id. at 698 (emphasis added). 
238 Id. at 726 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
239 Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 542 (2004) (internal quotation omitted). 
240 E.g., United States Nat. Bank of Oregon v. Independent Ins. Agents of America, Inc., 
508 U.S. 439, 455, 462 (1993) (correcting “a simple scrivener’s error” that caused 
“punctuation marks [to be] misplaced”). 
241 Holloway v. U.S., 526 U.S. 1, 19 n.2 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting);  Green v. Bock 
Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528-529 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
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  Nor are these methodological inconsistencies simply the inevitable 
result of cycling and voting paradoxes on a multi-member Court.  
Individual Justices also demonstrate methodological inconsistency.  For 
example, Justice Scalia typically is the Court’s strongest vote to support 
the Chevron principle that an ambiguous provision in an administrative 
agency’s organic statute constitutes a delegation of power to the agency to 
resolve the ambiguity, regardless of the reason why the ambiguity may 
have occurred.242  Yet even he quietly joined the Court’s opinion in Food 
& Drug Administration v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,243 in 
which the Court determined that in some, extraordinary cases, a court can 
simply tell that a matter is so important that it is unlikely that Congress 
would have left it for an agency to decide.244  Thus, individual Justices, 
like the Court as a whole, seem to lack truly firm methodological 
commitments.245
 The Court’s statutory interpretation cases raise a nice issue with regard 
to the scope of stare decisis.  The Court has said that, “[w]hen an opinion 
issues for the Court, it is not only the result but also those portions of the 
opinion necessary to that result by which we are bound.”246  As shown 
above, however, the Court’s actual cases make clear that when the Court 
issues opinions interpreting statutes, stare decisis effect attaches to the 
ultimate holding as to the meaning of the particular statute interpreted, but 
not to general methodological pronouncements, no matter how apparently 
firm.  One might well ask why the Court regards itself as less bound by its 
decisions regarding methods than by the results of the methods as 
                                                 
242 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865 
(1984) (listing various possible reasons why an ambiguity might occur in a statute and 
stating, “[f]or judicial purposes, it matters not which of these things occurred”); United 
States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 257 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Chevron sets forth an 
across-the-board presumption . . . .  Ambiguity means Congress intended agency 
discretion.”); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 454-55 (1987) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (objecting to the Court’s suggestion that Chevron deference 
would not apply to a “pure question of statutory construction”); N.L.R.B. v. United Food 
and Commercial Workers Union, 484 U.S. 112, 134 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(reiterating that the test for Chevron deference is simply whether a statute is silent or 
ambiguous). 
243 529 U.S. 120 (2000). 
244 Id. at 159-60. 
245 Similarly, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, recently 
complained in a dissenting opinion that the Court was not properly following the strong 
unitary principle.  Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 125 S. Ct. 1807, 1819 & n.5 (2005) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting).  As noted in the text immediately infra, all four of these Justices have 
previously embraced the polymorphic principle. 
246 Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 67 (1996).  
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 applied.247
 That question, however, interesting though it is, is reserved for some 
other article.  For present purposes, it suffices to note that the Court’s 
apparently unqualified rejection of the polymorphic principle in Clark v. 
Martinez cannot be taken as binding for the future.  Although occasions 
for application of the polymorphic principle arise infrequently, one may 
expect to see some future opinion in which the Court reverts to form and 
applies the polymorphic principle.  
 This prospect seems particularly likely when one takes a closer look at 
the voting patterns of the Justices involved.  Justice Scalia might be 
expected to adhere to the strong unitary principle for the future—as noted, 
he applied it in Martinez, even though doing so yielded a result he surely 
disfavors, as shown by his dissent in Zadvydas.  Looking, however, at the 
six other Justices who joined Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court in 
Martinez, we can see that all six have also written or joined opinions 
applying the polymorphic principle.  Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice 
Breyer, evinced strongly implied constitutional avoidance polymorphism 
in her concurrence in Vermont Agency.  Justice Souter, joined by Justices 
Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, urged the use of express stare decisis 
polymorphism in Bossier Parish.  And Justices O’Connor and Kennedy 
joined Justice White’s opinion applying express subconstitutional 
polymorphism in Will v. Michigan Department of State Police.  Even the 
Chief Justice, who dissented in Clark v. Martinez, joined the Court in 
Illinois Council, which used express constitutional avoidance 
polymorphism, and in Richmond, which used express policy 
polymorphism. 
 It seems likely, therefore, that Justice Scalia is the Court’s sole firm 
believer in the strong unitary principle.248  The other Justices who joined 
                                                 
247 Rosenkranz observes that “the Justices do not seem to treat methodology as part of the 
holding of case law.”  Rosenkranz, supra note 5, at 2144.  He points out that Justice 
Scalia, for example, does not consider himself bound by the Court’s frequent 
demonstration that it regards legislative history as a legitimate tool of statutory 
construction.  Id.  The examples given in the text show that the matter goes beyond 
individual Justices.  The Court itself does not seem to regard cases as setting binding 
precedent concerning methodology. 
248 Justice Thomas, in his dissenting opinion in Clark v. Martinez, professes adherence to 
the unitary principle, see 125 S. Ct. at 730 (Thomas, J., dissenting), and attempts to 
characterize his understanding of the statute at issue as involving “a single and 
unchanging, if implausible, meaning.”  Id.  Still, this reading, that “the detention period 
authorized by § 1231(a)(6) depends not only on the circumstances surrounding a 
removal, but also on the type of alien ordered removed,” id., involves the kind of verbal 
trick discussed earlier, under which any interpretation of any statute could be 
characterized as unitary by reading sufficient nuance into the critical term or phrase.  
Effectively, Justice Thomas advocates a polymorphic reading of the statute.  (In fairness, 
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 Justice Scalia’s opinion in Martinez approve of the result, but are unlikely 
to consider themselves firmly bound by the case’s methodology.  The 
polymorphic principle will probably prevail again. 
 
 B.  Practical Polymorphic Advice 
 Given that polymorphism is probably going to return, it is appropriate 
to consider how it should be used in practice.  This section attempts to set 
forth some guidelines for the use of the polymorphic principle. 
 The guidelines, of course, cannot provide a perfect, mechanically 
applicable rule that tells courts exactly when to apply the polymorphic 
principle.  But that is not troubling.  There is no perfect rule that tells 
courts when to depart from the general canon that terms or phrases 
appearing multiple times in a single statute should bear the same meaning 
each time, but courts manage all the same.  They exercise judgment in 
determining when incongruities that would result from applying the canon 
outweigh its natural force.  The same is true with regard to the 
polymorphic principle.  The only ultimate guideline is that the unitary 
principle is the general rule, but that incongruities that result from 
applying it to a particular statute may cause a court to conclude that the 
statute demands application of the polymorphic principle. 
 That said, a couple of thoughts regarding practical application of the 
polymorphic principle may be noted.  First, the principle seems most 
appropriate when some special rule of statutory interpretation, which 
deflects courts from the most natural interpretation of statutory text, 
applies to one application of a statutory phrase but not to others.  Thus, it 
is not surprising to find the polymorphic principle appearing most 
commonly in cases involving constitutional avoidance or other, special, 
subconstitutional rules of interpretation.249  In straightforward situations 
where no such special rule applies, the unitary principle seems more 
appropriate.  Thus, for example, in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), which grants 
district courts the diversity jurisdiction in cases involving four possible 
party configurations provided the amount in controversy “exceeds the sum 
or value of $75,000,” one would strongly expect that the amount-in-
controversy requirement would apply uniformly, inasmuch as there is no 
special rule of interpretation that applies to the amount requirement’s 
interaction with just one of the party configurations. 
 Second, where a special rule does deflect a court from the most natural 
reading of a statutory phrase with regard to one application, and the court 
therefore needs to decide whether the special reading should apply to all 
                                                                                                                         
one should note that Justice Thomas really wanted the Court to overrule its prior decision 
in Zadvydas and adopt a unitary reading of the statute that would permit indefinite 
detention of aliens in any of the statute’s categories.  Id. at 736.) 
249  See supra Parts II.B.1, II.B.2. 
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 applications, the court might find guidance in considering which is the 
primary application of the statute and which the unusual case.  If the 
special construction principle applies to the statute’s main application, it 
might be more appropriate to carry that reading over to all applications, 
but if the special principle applies to the less central application, it might 
be most appropriate to read the statute polymorphically, so that the main 
application is not infected by the special case. 
 Thus, under this guideline, perhaps the most appropriate application of 
the polymorphic principle in the cases discussed earlier would be that of 
Library of Congress v. Shaw, which concerned the award of interest on 
attorney’s fees under Title VII.  Title VII applies to both private 
employers and to the federal government, but in terms of simple numbers, 
its application to cases of private employment must surely be expected to 
dwarf its application to cases against the federal government, because the 
private sector is so much larger.  If the courts have determined that awards 
of interest are essential in cases against private parties in order for the 
purposes of Title VII to be fully realized, it would be inappropriate to let 
the relatively special case of the federal government, where a special rule 
makes interest unavailable, control the statute’s main application. 
 This guideline might also suggest that courts should not feel as 
strongly obliged to adhere to the unitary principle as they have in the one 
area where the matter has received much attention, namely, the case of 
statutes that impose civil and criminal penalties on the same conduct.  
With regard to some of these statutes, such as the Racketeer Influenced 
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), application of the unitary principle 
seems appropriate.  Criminal enforcement is a central theme of RICO.  To 
the extent that the rule of lenity might suggest narrowing RICO’s 
provisions, that narrowing would occur in RICO’s main arena.  On the 
other hand, consider a statute as to which enforcement is overwhelmingly 
civil and any criminal penalties are a rarely-invoked statutory detail.  As to 
such statutes, it would seem odd to deny the statute the full effect that 
would follow from giving its provisions the best reading, just because the 
rare criminal prosecution might demand a narrower reading.  Indeed, 
application of the unitary principle creates the paradox that, although 
Congress would probably imagine itself to be strengthening a statute by 
adding criminal penalties to it, in some respects the addition of such 
penalties has the effect of weakening the statute, because courts may then 
feel obliged to apply the rule of lenity even when applying the statute in 
civil cases.  This curious paradox suggests that courts should be somewhat 
more open to applying the polymorphic principle in such situations. 
 Fortunately, as Professor Lawrence Solan has observed, the issue is 
often, as a practical matter, taken care of by the institutional structures that 
arise with regard to enforcement of such “mixed” statutes.  Courts may 
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 give the statute its most natural reading in civil cases, despite the pull of 
the rule of lenity.  Nonetheless, the institution of prosecutorial discretion 
may tend to ensure that the government brings criminal prosecutions only 
in cases presenting the most obvious and egregious statutory violations.  
Such prosecutorial practices mimic the rule of lenity.  Under such  an 
institutional structure, the effect of the polymorphic principle is 
achieved—the statute is given the best reading in civil cases and the rule 
of lenity is, in effect, applied  to criminal cases—even though the courts 
do not expressly invoke the polymorphic principle.250
  
 C.  The Role of Congress 
 Finally, it is appropriate to consider the role of Congress with regard to 
the polymorphic principle.  Indeed, in Martinez, the Court suggested that 
protecting Congress was one of the reasons for its adoption of the strong 
unitary principle.  The Court asserted that the polymorphic principle 
would not only be “novel” and “dangerous,” but that it would be “beyond 
the power of Congress to remedy.”251   
 Whatever the value of the Court’s other arguments, this one is 
certainly incorrect.  Congress has authority to prescribe rules of statutory 
interpretation.252  Congress could include, in any particular statute, a 
“unitary principle” provision, which could specify that “each term or 
phrase in this statute has, with regard to any single time it appears, a single 
meaning.”  Congress’s power to include such a provision in any single 
statute could be no more controversial than its power to include a 
“definitions” section, which is universally accepted.  
 Moreover, what Congress can do with regard to each particular statute, 
it could also do by means of one, general statute.  If Congress desired to 
pass a “Strong Unitary Principle Act,” it could, by that single statute, 
specify that courts should understand all of its statutes to embody the 
strong unitary principle.  Some scholars have occasionally suggested that 
such general interpretive statutes would impermissibly encroach on the 
judicial power,253  but, as I have explained in detail elsewhere, such 
arguments are implausible and contrary to precedent.254  Even if, 
somehow, Congress lacked the power to prescribe the strong unitary 
principle as a general rule of interpretation for the future, it could certainly 
pass one statute that amends all existing statutes so as to prescribe the 
                                                 
250 Solan, supra note 6, at 2218-37. 
251 125 S. Ct. at 727. 
252 Jonathan R. Siegel, The Use of Legislative History in a System of Separated Powers, 
53 Vand. L. Rev. 1457, 1500-05 (2000); see also Rosenkranz, supra note 5, at 2102-40. 
253 See Siegel, supra note 252, at 1501. 
254 Id. at 1501-03. 
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 strong unitary principle as a rule for their construction.  Thus, at the very 
least, Congress, if it did not care for the polymorphic principle, could 
block its use by first passing one statute to cover the existing corpus of 
federal statutory law and by then including the strong unitary principle as 
a boilerplate part of the “definitions” section of each subsequently-enacted 
statute.  Contrariwise, Congress could also expressly authorize courts to 
do what they do anyway—apply the polymorphic principle where 
appropriate. 
 The Supreme Court is wrong, therefore, to suggest that it must avoid 
the polymorphic principle in order to protect Congress from something 
beyond Congress’s power to correct.  Indeed, subject to the usual caveat 
about the dangers of drawing inferences from congressional silence, 
Congress’s failure to repudiate the polymorphic principle, in the face of 
the courts’ use of it over the years, might be taken as indicating that 
Congress does not object to it.  Perhaps Congress thinks that the courts are 
doing a good job by generally following the dictate of the weak unitary 
principle but deviating from that principle on appropriate, infrequent 
occasions.  In any event, Congress could codify the strong unitary 
principle if it desired to do so. 
 But should it?  Probably not.  As noted earlier, the essence of the 
canons of construction is their generality.  They apply to the whole 
universe of potential statutes.  The reason that the canons are only general 
guides is that it is difficult to find a principle of construction that reaches 
truly sound results in every case.  It is impossible to anticipate every 
statutory circumstance to which a canon might someday apply.  Codifying 
the strong unitary principle would surely lead to unfortunate results in 
some future case in which Congress does not fully realize the difficulties 
of unitary construction of some particular statutory text.  There is just no 
way of entirely eliminating the need for judgment to be exercised by the 
agents who apply the statutes to particular cases, i.e., the courts. 
 Probably, therefore, it is best for Congress to leave things as they are.  
The good sense of the unitary principle will guarantee that it will always 
remain the basic, general interpretive guide.  In exceptional cases, the 
courts will exercise their sound judgment to determine that a particular 
statute calls for application of the polymorphic principle. 
    
 CONCLUSION 
  
 The Supreme Court erred both descriptively and normatively in Clark 
v. Martinez.  As a descriptive matter, it is simply not true to assert that the 
polymorphic principle is “novel.”  Nor, as a normative matter, is it 
“dangerous.”  In appropriate cases, the polymorphic principle can be a 
proper exercise of sound judicial discretion.   
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  It is an error to believe that the process of statutory interpretation can 
ever be mechanized or reduced to a set of determinate, nondiscretionary 
rules.  Any attempt to do so is likely to provide only the illusion of 
objectivity while maintaining the necessity for judicial choice.  We should 
not be ashamed of judicial choice.  Appropriately limited judicial choice 
has been a feature of the judicial power since the beginning, and it plays a 
vital role in our system of government.  Certainly our system allows, and 
indeed demands, the range of judicial choice necessary to implement the 
polymorphic principle. 
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